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 1 
Introduction 
The restoration of the Baltic states’ independence, back in 1991, brought about a 
number of political and legal challenges. The presence of large non-titular 
communities in Estonia and Latvia1 has proven to be the most pressing of these. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the European Commission already in 1997 concluded 
that ‘on the whole the rights of the Russian-speaking minorities are observed and 
safeguarded’2, the legal status of these living relics of the Soviet period remains 
controversial.3 A resolution of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, 
adopted on 13 June 2002, criticised the protection of national minorities in Estonia.4 
In the lead-up to the December 2003 parliamentary elections, the Russian Duma 
adopted a resolution ‘on gross violations of human and minority rights in the Republic 
of Latvia’.5 Dmitry Rogozin, chairman of the Parliamentarian Committee on 
International Relations, announced that Russia should consider the weapon of 
economic sanctions to put pressure on the Baltic state, which he described as ‘a land 
of hooligans’ where ‘Nazis have come to power’.6 Whereas these statements have to 
be situated within the context of the ongoing election campaign, the remarks of 
Alvaro Gil-Robles, European Council Commissioner for Human Rights, are to be 
taken more serious. During his visit to Riga in October 2003, the High Commissioner 
criticized the lack of citizenship for more than twenty per cent of Latvia’s population 
and recommended the granting of voting rights to non-citizens in municipal 
                                                 
1 Only 58.2 per cent of the Latvian population is ethnically Latvian whereas 67.9 per cent of the 
Estonian population is ethnically Estonian. Russians constitute the largest ethnic minority in both 
countries (29.2 per cent in Latvia and 25.6 per cent in Estonia). See: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/Latvia/index.htm and 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/estonia/index.htm  
2 Commission Opinion on Estonia’s Application for Membership of the European Union, COM (97) 
2006 final, 13. [hereafter referred to as ‘Commission Opinion on Estonia’]. 
3 See for instance the discussions surrounding the withdrawal of Martijans Bekasovs as Latvia’s 
observer in the European Parliament as a result of his complaints about the problems of Latvia’s 
Russian-speaking minorities. Dace Akule and Marcin Frydrych, “Parliamentarian sacked for backing 
Russian rights”, EUObserver, 5 Nov. 2003, at http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=13370.     
4 The resolution, inter alia, stated that ‘protection of national minorities is not always addressed in an 
adequate manner in the legislative process and administrative practice’. Resolution ResCMN (2002)8 
on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by 
Estonia.    
5 Declaration of the State Duma in connection with major violations of human rights and the rights of 
national minorities in the Latvian Republic, adopted on 14 October 2003. Unofficial translation at 
http://pws.prserv.net/misrusce/duma_latv.htm   
6 X, “Russia issues new threats to Latvia”, Baltic Times, 16 Oct. 2003.  
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elections.7 On the other hand, Günter Verheugen, EU Commissioner responsible for 
enlargement, declared that Latvia fulfils all the criteria in the field of societal 
integration and has complied with all international requirements regarding its ethnic 
minorities.8  
 
The striking differences between the statements of the Council of Europe and 
European Union representatives contribute to the existing ambiguity surrounding the 
legal status of Estonia’s and Latvia’s Russian-speaking and often stateless minorities. 
This issue is of particular importance in the light of these countries’ accession to the 
EU on 1 May 2004. The question remains whether this new situation will bring 
changes to the legal status of the Russian-speaking population in general and the non-
citizens in particular. This paper tries to trace the origins of the existing problems, 
taking into account the Baltic states’ specific historical and constitutional framework. 
In addition, it tries to evaluate the relevant EU legislation in order to define the rights 
of non-citizens in an enlarged EU.  
 
1. State continuity and the legacy of the Soviet period 
Any analysis of the present situation has to take into account the burden of history. 
This is particularly true for the Baltic states, whose statehood is essentially based on 
the concept of legal continuity between the independent inter-war republics and the 
states that arose out of the disintegrated Soviet Union.9 The forcible incorporation of 
the Baltic states into the Soviet Union in 1940, on the basis of secret protocols to the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, is considered to be null and void. Even though the Soviet 
Union occupied these countries for a period of fifty years, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania continued to exist as subjects of international law.  
 
                                                 
7 Kathleen Knox, “Latvia: European Rights Official Stirs Debate With Citizenship, Voting Comments”, 
RFE/RL, 15 Oct. 2003, at http://www.rferl.org/features/2003/10/10102003164255.asp. X, “Bitter Pill”, 
Baltic Times, 16 Oct. 2003. 
8 Sannija Jauce,  “Latvia and Estonia adhere to all regulations on ethnic minorities – Verheugen”, 
LETA, 6 Nov. 2003, at http://www.leta.lv   
9 Peter Van Elsuwege, “State Continuity and its Consequences: The Case of the Baltic States”, 16 
Leiden Journal of International Law (2003), 377-388; Lauri, Mälksoo, Illegal Annexation and State 
Continuity: The Case of the Incorporation of the Baltic States by the USSR  (The Hague, 2003), 45-78.   
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Estonia and Latvia proceeded from this assumption to restore their pre-war citizenship 
legislation. Accordingly, only citizens of the pre-war republics and their descendents 
were entitled to citizenship in 1991. Citizens of the former Soviet Union who had 
arrived during the Soviet era and their children had - and have - to pass a process of 
naturalisation to receive an Estonian or Latvian passport. This procedure implies inter 
alia that the candidates have to prove their knowledge of the constitution, the history 
and the national anthem; they have to swear an oath of allegiance and, foremost, they 
have to pass an examination testing proficiency in the national language.10 This 
situation, which was only clarified after an initial period of absolute legal 
uncertainty11, implies that both Estonia and Latvia have to deal with a large number of 
stateless persons, called ‘non-citizens’ or ‘aliens’.12 Lithuania, alternatively, preferred 
to apply the so-called zero-option, which meant the granting of citizenship to all 
permanent residents of the restored Lithuanian state regardless of nationality and 
without any language requirements.13  
 
The implementation of the citizenship legislation coincided with the development of 
new language laws. Without voting rights, the majority of Russian-speakers in both 
Estonia and Latvia had little opportunity to influence the formulation of a restrictive 
linguistic legislation, including language requirements for employment and the 
mandatory use of the state language in various areas.14 Lithuania, in contrast, did not 
adopt similar restrictions. 
 
The different choices of Estonia and Latvia on the one hand and Lithuania on the 
other can be linked to their different demographical situation at the moment of 
restored independence. According to the last Soviet census of 1989, the share of the 
titular population in Estonia and Latvia had dropped to 62 and 52 per cent 
respectively. In Lithuania, the proportion of ethnic Lithuanians remained at 
                                                 
10 Article 12 of the Latvian Citizenship Law, at http://www.ttc.lv and Article 6 of the Estonian 
Citizenship Act, at http://www.legaltext.ee.  
11 The Latvia Citizenship law has been adopted on 22 June 1994, the Estonian Citizenship Act on 19 
January 1995.  
12 In Latvia, the legal status of these persons is based on the ‘Law on the Status of Former USSR 
Citizens Who are not Citizens of Latvia or Any Other State’, at: http://www.humanrights.lv, adopted on 
12 April 1995. In Estonia, the Aliens Act, at http://www.legaltext.ee, adopted on 8 July 1993 is 
applicable to this category of persons. 
13 The Lithuanian Citizenship Law, at http://www.urm.lt, was passed on 5 December 1991.   
14 For an overview, Boris Tsilevich,, “Development of the Language Legislation in the Baltic States”, 
3(2) Journal on Multicultural Societies, at http://www.unesco.org/most/vl3n2edi.htm.   
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approximately 80 per cent.15  Only 13,7 per cent of the Russian-speaking population 
in Estonia reported proficiency in the Estonian language. In Latvia and Lithuania the 
corresponding figures were 22,7 and 33,5 per cent.16 In this context, widespread 
concerns about the ‘imminent extinction’ of the Estonian and Latvian nation 
contributed to the adoption of restrictive language and citizenship laws. A similar 
threat was less outspoken in Lithuania, which preferred a more liberal approach 
towards the integration of its Russian-speaking minorities.  
 
The Estonian and Latvian options attracted the attention of various international 
organisations, particularly in the light of the unpredictable and unstable situation in 
Russia. By the end of 1993, the initial pro-western policy of Boris Yeltsin and his 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Kozyrev, had come to an end.17 Simultaneously, 
the growing popularity of the ‘Red-Brown’ coalition of former communists and 
extreme right organizations forced the Russian government to adopt a more assertive 
approach towards foreign policy problems. In April 1993, a new military doctrine 
suggested that maltreatment of Russians in the so-called ‘near-abroad’, defined as ‘the 
geopolitical space of the former Soviet-Union’, could be construed as grounds for 
Russian military intervention.18 In this context, the drafting of Estonia’s legislation on 
the status of non-citizens provoked the scarcely revealing threat that ‘given the natural 
desire of the Russian-speaking population to protect itself from blatant discrimination, 
Russia will be unable to remain a disinterested observer.’19 President Yeltsin, who 
described the Estonian policy as ‘ a practice of ethnic cleansing’ and ‘the introduction 
                                                 
15 Lithuania’s specific historical and socio-economic development can explain the relatively small 
number of Russian-speakers in comparison to the other Baltic republics. First, Lithuania has a long 
tradition of independent statehood which goes back to the Middle Ages. It came under Russian 
dominance after the disintegration of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1795), which is more than 
a century after the incorporation of the Baltic provinces into the Russian empire of tsar Peter the Great. 
Consequently, the northern part of the Baltic region has a longer tradition of Russian settlement. 
Secondly, Lithuania was not so much affected by the industrial revolution at the end of the nineteenth 
century. The Soviets considered the Lithuanian republic as a primarily agricultural area, which largely 
reduced the influx of Russian migrant workers. Finally, the higher birth rate of Catholic Lithuania in 
comparison to Protestant Estonia and Latvia guaranteed a consistent majority of ethnic Lithuanians.   
16 Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence  (New 
Haven, 2nd ed. 1994), 183-184. 
17  Peter Truscott, Russia First. Breaking with the West ( London, 1997), 152. 
18 Richard Löwenhardt, The Reincarnation of Russia. Struggling with the Legacy of Communism 1990 -
1994 (London, 1995), 116. 
19 Statement by the President of the Russian Federation of 24 June 1993. Annex to a letter dated 25 
June 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General concerning the situation of human rights in Estonia and Latvia, 
A/48/223.  
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of an Estonian form of apartheid’, clearly stated that Russia had the means ‘to remind 
the Estonian leaders about certain geographical and demographical realities.’20 Taking 
into account the continued presence of Russian troops and the existence of border 
disputes between Russia and both Estonia and Latvia, the alleged discrimination of 
Russian-speaking minorities produced an environment with huge potential for 
conflict.  
 
2. Reaction of the international community 
This confrontational course of events clearly threatened the fragile stability in the 
entire Baltic region and demanded a clear-cut response from the side of the 
international community. Against the background of the outbreak of ethnic violence 
in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus, the Member States of the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) decided to establish permanent missions in 
Tallinn and Riga, operating in close co-operation with the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Max van der Stoel.21 This constant monitoring, in combination with 
the High Commissioner’s diplomatic recommendations, decreased the plausibility of 
violent escalation. In addition, the Council of Europe provided legal expertise and 
advice on draft citizenship and language laws. Last but not least, the European Union 
developed its own strategy of ‘preventive diplomacy’ within the framework of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy as provided under the Treaty of Maastricht. 
This plan, leading to a ‘Pact on Stability in Europe’, was essentially based on the 
proposals of the French Prime Minister Eduard Balladur22 and entered into the EU’s 
institutional framework as a result of the June 1993 Copenhagen European Council.23 
The basic objective of ‘fostering good neighbourly relations and encouraging 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 Rob Zaagman, Conflict Prevention in the Baltic States: The OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania , (Flensburg, 1999), 15. 
22 Takako Ueta, “The Stability Pact: from the Balladur Initiative to the EU Joint Action”, in Martin 
Holland (ed.), Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Record and Reforms (London, Washington, 
1997), 92-104. 
23 The June 1993 Copenhagen European Council ‘welcomed the idea of using the instrument of ‘joint 
action’ in accordance with the procedures provided for in the common foreign and security policy.’ 
Accordingly, the Council adopted decision 93/728/CFSP on 20 December 1993 (OJ L339, 1993) and 
reported to the December Brussels European Council. On 14 June 1994 the Council adopted decision 
94/367/CFSP on the continuation of the joint action. Eventually, the Pact on Stability was adopted on 
the occasion of the Paris Conference on 20-21 March 1995. This conference completed the joint action 
and transferred the responsibility for the implementation of the Stability Pact to the OSCE.  
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countries to consolidate their borders and to resolve the problems of national 
minorities’ clearly applied to the confrontational situation between the Baltic states 
and Russia.24 Within this framework a ‘Baltic Round Table’ brought together officials 
from both parties, with the EU in the role of moderator. This ‘confidence building 
measure’25 coincided with the introduction of conditionality provisions in the bilateral 
agreements between the EC/EU and each of the Baltic republics.  
 
In contrast to similar agreements concluded with other Central and Eastern European 
countries, the Trade and Cooperation Agreements (TCAs) with the Baltic states 
contained a specific reference to democratic principles and human rights.26 A serious 
violation of these principles could lead to the suspension of the agreements.27 Edwige 
Tucny argues that the EC included this provision in the light of the precarious 
situation of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia.28 Notwithstanding 
the potential applicability of the conditionality clause to this specific problem, her 
statement seems to disregard the gradual evolution of the EC’s human rights policy. 
Already in June 1991, even before the recognition of the restored independence of the 
Baltic republics, the Luxembourg European Council adopted a declaration which 
referred to the practice of ‘including clauses on human rights in economic and 
cooperation agreements with third countries’.29 Furthermore, the fact that identical 
conditionality clauses were included in the TCAs with Albania and Slovenia plays 
                                                 
24 Sven Arnswald suggests that the conflicts between Russia and the Baltic States had been a major 
incentive for the initiation of the Pact. Sven Arnswald,  “The Politics of Integrating the Baltic States 
into the EU – Phases and Instruments”, in Matthias Jopp and Sven Arnswald (eds.), The European 
Union and the Baltic States. Visions, Interests and Strategies for the Baltic Sea Region  (Helsinki, 
1998), 31.  It has to be mentioned, however, that this Pact was not exclusively devised for the specific 
situation of the Baltic States whereas the outbreak of ethnic violence in Yugoslavia can be seen as the 
primary incentive for the development of the Stability Pact. 
25 Arnswald, ibid., p.32. 
26 E.g. Article 1 of the TCA with Estonia states that ‘Respect for the democratic principles and human 
rights established by the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a new Europe inspires the 
domestic and external policies of the Community and Estonia and constitutes and essential element of 
the present agreement.’ Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of 
Estonia on trade and commercial and economic cooperation. O.J., 1992, L403/4. An identical provision 
is included in the TCA’s with Latvia (O.J., 1992, L403/13) and Lithuania (O.J., 1992, L403/22) 
27 E.g. Article 21 of the TCA with Estonia states that ‘The parties reserve the right to suspend this 
Agreement in whole or in part with immediate effect if a serious violation occurs of the essential 
provisions of the present Agreement.’ Agreement between the European Economic Community and the 
Republic of Estonia on trade and commercial and economic cooperation. O.J., 1992, L403/7.  An 
identical provision is included in the TCA’s with Latvia (O.J., 1992, L403/16) and Lithuania (O.J., 
1992, L403/25)  
28 Edwige Tucny, L’Elargissement de l’Union Européenne aux pays d’Europe centrale et orientale . La 
conditionalité politique (Paris, 2000), 104-105. 
29 Presidency conclusions Luxembourg European Council. Annex V, Declaration on human rights, 
Bull. EC, 1991, 6, I.45. 
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down the assumption that this mechanism was devised for the specific case of the 
Baltic states.30 Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that the inclusion of 
conditionality clauses in the bilateral agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
forms an important aspect of the EC/EU involvement in this area.  
 
Conditionality, however, is not an unequivocal concept.31 Parallel to the 
‘conditionality clauses’, which constitute the EC/EU’s stick behind the door, the 
perspective of strengthened relations and eventual accession provided an important 
incentive (carrot) to promote the development of the Baltic states’ minority policies. 
The preamble to the TCAs, for instance, contained a provision for further 
development of relations. The established contractual links were considered to 
‘contribute to progress towards the objective of an association agreement in due 
course, when conditions are met.’32 The June 1993 Copenhagen European Council 
also underlined that it remained the objective of the Community to conclude Europe 
Agreements as soon as the necessary conditions had been fulfilled.33 In the meantime, 
the EC and its Member States concluded Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with each of 
the Baltic states. The FTAs, on their turn, referred to the prospect of association and 
recognised Estonia’s, Latvia’s and Lithuania’s ultimate objective ‘to become a 
member of the EU’.34 The eventual conclusion of Europe Agreements with these 
countries in June 1995 brought them to the centre of the pre-accession process35, 
which implied the further application of the EU’s conditionality policy.  
                                                 
30 From the Europe Agreement with Bulgaria onwards (see O.J. 1994 L 233/24) onwards, the ‘explicit 
suspension clause’ has been replaced by a ‘general non-execution clause’, which provides for the 
possibility of political negotiations before the suspension of the agreement. The differences between 
the ‘Baltic’ and the ‘Bulgarian clause are laid down in a Commission Communication on the inclusion 
of respect for democratic principles and human rights in agreements between the Community and Third 
Countries, COM (95) 216 final. 
See also: Kris Pollet, “Human Rights Clauses in Agreements between the European Union and Central 
and Eastern European Countries”, 7(3) RAE-LEA (1997), 293-294. 
31 Erwan Lannon, Kirstyn Inglis, and Tom Haenebalcke, “The Many Faces of EU Conditionality in 
Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Relations”, in Marc Maresceau, and Erwan Lannon, (eds.), The EU’s 
Enlargement and Mediterranean Stategies. A Comparative Analysis (Houndmills 2001), 97-138. 
32 Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Estonia on trade and 
commercial and economic cooperation. O.J., 1992, L403/2. (Latvia and Lithuania: O.J., 1992, L403/11 
and L403/20). 
33 Presidency conclusions Copenhagen European Council, (21-22 June 1993), Bull. EC., 1993, 6, 1.14.  
34 Agreement on free trade and trade-related matters between the European Community, the European 
Atomic Energy Community and the European Coal and Steel Community, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Estonia, of the other part, O.J., 1994, L373/2. (similar agreement with Latvia and 
Lithuania: O.J., 1994, L374/2 and L375/2.)  
35 Initially, the Europe Agreements were regarded by the European Community as association 
agreements, providing more of an alternative to accession than a pre-accession instrument. This 
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To reach their ultimate objective of becoming EU Member States, the Baltic countries 
had to satisfy the political and economic criteria for accession as identified by the 
June 1993 Copenhagen European Council. This, inter alia, implies stable institutions 
‘guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
promotion of minorities.’36 The December 1994 Essen European Council added the 
political condition of ‘bon voisinage’ to the Copenhagen requirements.37 Multiple 
references to the necessity of good neighbourly relations and the importance of the 
Pact on Stability in Europe provided an interesting framework for the evolving Baltic-
Russian relations. In this regard it is noteworthy that the first Commission 
Communication on the establishment of a specific policy towards the Baltic Sea 
region explicitly referred to the issue of the Russian-speaking population and the EU’s 
role as go-between: 
“An appropriate integration of non-citizens, in particular the Russian-
speaking residents of the Baltic states, especially Latvia and Estonia, in 
accordance with relevant recommendations from international organisations 
as well as a constructive dialogue between the parties concerned would 
strongly contribute to the improvement of regional security and stability. In 
this context the Union has a role in promoting the observance of the 
fundamental values which now bind the countries of the region including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities.”38  
 
3. EU pre-accession conditionality and its consequences 
Within the legal framework of the EU accession process, the European Commission 
plays a primarily role in the monitoring of the pre-accession conditionality. In 
accordance with Article O TEU (now Art. 49 EU), the Commission presented its 
Opinions on the applications for membership together with Agenda 2000, an 
elaborated strategy paper on the policies of the Union and the impact of enlargement, 
                                                                                                                                            
situation changed as a result of the Copenhagen European Council of 21-22 June 1993. On the political 
reorientation of the Europe Agreements, see Kirstyn Inglis, “The Europe Agreements Compared in the 
Light of their Pre-Accession Reorientation”, 37 CML Rev. (2000), 1173- 1210. 
36 Presidency conclusions Copenhagen European Council, (21-22 June 1993), Bull. EC., 1993, 6, 1.14. 
37 Presidency conclusions Essen European Council, (9-10 December 1994), Bull. EU., 1994, 12, I.54. 
38 Communication from the Commission to the Council, Orientations for a Union Approach towards 
the Baltic Sea Region, SEC(94) 1747 final, Brussels, 25 Oct. 1994, 3. 
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on 17 July 1997. Concerning the fate of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia 
and Latvia, the Commission concluded that ‘there is no evidence that these minorities 
are subject to discrimination except for problems of access to certain professions in 
Latvia’.39 Furthermore, the Commission observed that ‘the rate of naturalisation of 
non-citizens has been slow in both countries’ and recommended the acceleration of 
this process ‘to ensure the integration of non-citizens’.40 The country reports 
attributed these problems to the relative difficulty of the tests, the high enrolment fees 
of the examination, and the fact that non-possession of Estonian or Latvian citizenship 
may have appeared as an advantage.41  
 
A comparison between the reports on Estonia and Latvia reveals a striking difference 
between the Commission’s observation that in Latvia ‘non-citizens continue to be 
affected by various types of discrimination’42 whereas in Estonia ‘foreigners are 
subject to some restrictions’.43 The Commission Opinion on Latvia criticised the so-
called ‘window system’, which restricted the right to apply for naturalisation 
according to age brackets, and the fact that non-citizens are barred from certain 
occupations. Ten differences in status between citizens and non-citizens were 
assumed to be contrary to the Latvian Constitution and the UN Convention on Civil 
and Political Rights. Moreover, the lack of political participation, even in local 
elections, and the poor protection of non-citizens’ fundamental rights had to be 
tackled. Finally, the European Commission maintained that ‘the Latvian authorities 
must consider ways to make it easier for stateless children born in Latvia to become 
naturalised.’44 A similar recommendation can be found in the Commission Opinion on 
Estonia. In general, however, the Commission produced a more favourable picture of 
the situation. Notwithstanding the existence of certain ‘restrictions’, the Estonian 
authorities are expected to resolve ‘some practical difficulties’. The granting of voting 
                                                 
39 Agenda 2000. For a stronger and wider Union (Vol. I). The Challenge of Enlargement (Vol. II), 
COM (97) 2000 final, 45. 
40 Agenda 2000, ibid. 
41 Commission Opinion on Latvia’s Application for Membership of the European Union, 
COM(97)2005 final, 15-18. [hereafter Opinion on Latvia] Commission Opinion on Estonia’s 
Application for Membership of the European Union, COM(97)2006 final, 13-15. [hereafter Opinion on 
Estonia] 
42 Opinion on Latvia, 17.   
43 Opinion on Estonia, 15. 
44 Opinion on Latvia,17-18. .According to Article 1 of the UN Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness and in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Article 24 of the 
International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, states are under an obligation to grant citizenship 
to children born in their territories who would otherwise be rendered stateless.  
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rights in local elections has been praised because it ‘effectively contributes towards 
the integration of non-citizens and the protection of their rights’.45 In contrast to the 
Opinion on Latvia, the general evaluation of the political situation in Estonia does not 
contain any references to the necessity of further efforts to ensure general equality of 
treatment for non-citizens and minorities. Finally, the Commission did not put into 
question the basic elements of the naturalisation process but only observed that ‘the 
main weakness in the present system lies in the inadequate resources available for 
Russian speakers to learn Estonian in order to sit in the naturalisation test.’46 In other 
words, the Commission identified the stimulation of language training as the main 
vehicle to speed up the rate of naturalisations and to proceed the process of societal 
integration.  
 
Despite the quite similar problems faced by the Russian-speaking and stateless 
communities in Estonia and Latvia, the Commission seemed to be less critical to the 
situation in Estonia. Consequently, the recommendation to start accession negotiations 
with this country, together with four other Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
applicant countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia), provoked 
extensive debate, analysis and speculation.47 Notwithstanding the storm of criticism to 
the Commission Opinions, the December 1997 Luxembourg European Council 
endorsed the recommendations to start accession negotiations with only five CEECs. 
Simultaneously, the European Council launched the ‘enhanced pre-accession 
strategy’, including Accession Partnerships, annual Commission reports on the 
progress towards accession and increased pre-accession aid.48 This strategy, which is 
obviously the EU’s diplomatic reaction to the controversial reception of the 
Commission Opinions, established a comprehensive legal framework for monitoring 
the situation in the applicant countries. The Accession Partnerships lay down the short 
and medium-term priorities on the basis of the Commission observations. The annual 
Commission reports, on their turn, assess the progress towards the fulfilment of these 
priorities and form the basis for updates of the Partnerships. Finally, financial 
assistance is targeted on the priorities of the Accession Partnerships. The entire 
                                                 
45 Opinion on Estonia, 15. 
46 ibid., 14. 
47 An overview of the reactions is listed in: Arnswald, 74-82. 
48 For a legal analysis of the enhanced pre-accession strategy, see Marc Maresceau, “Pre-Accession”, in 
Marise Cremona, (ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union (Oxford, 2003), 30-40. 
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strategy is based on the principle of financial conditionality. The ‘carrot’ of financial 
assistance can only be granted if certain conditions are satisfied, whereas Regulation 
622/98 on the establishment of Accession Partnerships contains the ‘stick’ of eventual 
sanctions.49   
 
The prospect of accession and the mechanism of financial conditionality have brought 
the EU in a privileged position to monitor and influence the minority situation in 
Estonia and Latvia. The proclaimed impact of the EU’s conditionality policy upon the 
situation of the Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia and Estonia is very 
controversial. Whereas certain observers subscribe to the official stance that the 
prospect of accession contributed to significant improvements concerning the 
naturalisation procedure and the legislation on the use of minority languages in 
official procedures50, others have criticised the European Commission’s flexible and 
favourable approach towards the restrictive policies of the Estonian and Latvian 
governments.51 
 
It cannot be denied that the European Commission recommendations contributed to 
changes in citizenship and language legislation. In 1998, for instance, Latvia 
abolished the ‘window system’ and granted, upon request of their parents, citizenship 
to stateless children born in Latvia after 21 August 1991. Furthermore, the Latvian 
government eliminated restrictions preventing non-citizens from working as fire-
fighters, airline staff, and pharmacists. Non-citizens could receive unemployment 
benefits without presenting certificates of Latvian language knowledge and the 
naturalisation procedures for people over the age of 65 and disabled persons were 
                                                 
49 Council Regulation (EC) No 622/98 of 16 March 1998 on assistance to the applicant States in the 
framework of the pre-accession strategy, and in particular on the establishment of Accession 
Partnerships, OJ 1998 L 085/1.  
50 See e.g. Mark A. Jubulis, “The External Dimension of Democratization in Latvia: the Impact of 
European Institutions”, 13 International Relations (1996), 59-73; Nida M. Gelazis, “The Effects of EU 
Conditionality on Citizenship Policies and Protection of National Minorities in the Baltic States”, in 
Vello Pettai and Jan Zielonka, The Road to the European Union (Vol. 2). Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania  
(Manchester, New York, 2003) , 46-74.; Jekaterina Dorodnova, “EU Concerns in Estonia and Latvia: 
Implications of Enlargement for Russia’s Behaviour Towards the Russian-speaking Minorities.”, EUI 
Working Papers 2000/40, 45. 
51 James Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse, “Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality 
and Minority Protection in the CEECs”, JEMIE (2003), at 
http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/download/Focus1-2003_Hughes_Sasse.pdf, 1-36; Marc Maresceau, 
“Quelques réflexions sur l’origine et l’application de principes fondamentaux dans la stratégie 
d’adhésion de l’UE”, to be published in Liber Amicorum Jean Raux (Rennes, 2004).   
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simplified.52 Similar amendments could be observed in Estonia. There is, therefore, 
little doubt that the process of EU accession has been a force for improvement. On the 
other hand, however, the Commission reports have been criticised for emphasising on 
the integration of minorities ‘to such an extent that it is plausible to argue that they 
indicate a preference for assimilation.’53 In particular, there is a focus on linguistic 
integration, ‘which the Reports interpret as the need to make minorities proficient in 
the official state language.’54 The basic idea that instruction of the national language 
is a prerequisite for societal integration can be found in all Accession Partnerships and 
Commission reports. Consequently, the EU’s technical and financial assistance in the 
field of minority protection is primarily targeted on language training.55 This policy 
does not necessarily reflect the aspirations of the non-titular population, which is 
voicing concerns that the process of integration threatens the preservation of their own 
language and culture. A good example of this conflict between the perceived necessity 
of further integration and the rights of the Russian-speaking minorities can be found 
in the field of education.  
 
4. Integration versus assimilation: how to find a balance? 
In Latvia, the 1998 Education Law foresees the introduction of Latvian as the 
language of instruction in all public secondary schools and the implementation of 
bilingual education in primary schools from 1 September 2004 onwards.56 This 
decision has provoked intensive discussions. According to the proponents of this 
legislation, the educational reform is a prerequisite for solving the problems of the 
Russian-speaking minorities. An educated knowledge of the official language 
allegedly promotes the competitiveness of non-Latvian speakers on the labour market 
and places them in a privileged position for the acquisition of Latvian citizenship. The 
Latvian educational system has, therefore, been described as ‘the most important 
driving force of the integration process.’57 The Russian-speaking community, on the 
                                                 
52 Gelazis, 67. 
53 Hughes and Sasse, 16. 
54 ibid. 
55 Within the framework of the PHARE programme 3,7 million euro has been allocated for Latvian 
language training whereas the Estonian Language Training Programme received 1,4 million euro in 
1997 and 3,1 million in 2001.  
56 The text of the Latvian Education Law is available at: http://www.ttc.lv  
57 National Programme “The Integration of Society in Latvia”, Riga, 2001, at http://www.ng.gov.lv, 56.   
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other hand, has expressed concern that the opportunities and guarantees for primary 
and secondary education in the minority language are increasingly limited.58 A joint 
statement of Latvia’s minority NGOs denounced the education reform as a disguised 
form of assimilation59 and the Association for the Support of Russian Language 
Schools in Latvia (LASHOR) stressed the importance of education in the mother 
tongue for the children’s intellectual development.60 These claims have been actively 
supported by the Russian Federation. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
accused Latvia of violating ‘the provisions and the spirit of the European Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.’61 Article 14,2 of this document, 
which has been signed but not yet ratified by Latvia, stipulates that:  
 
‘in areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally 
or in substantial numbers, if there is sufficient demand, the Parties shall 
endeavour to ensure, as far as possible and within the framework of their 
education systems, that persons belonging to those minorities have adequate 
opportunities for being taught the minority language or for receiving 
instruction in this language.’62  
 
The following paragraph, however, clearly limits the application of this provision:  
‘the opportunities for being taught the minority language or for receiving 
instruction in this language are without prejudice to the learning of the official 
language or the teaching in this language.’  
 
The explanatory report to the Convention explicitly subscribes the Latvian 
argumentation that ‘knowledge of the official language is a factor of social cohesion 
and integration.’63 Furthermore, the Russian allegation that the education reform leads 
to assimilation and would, therefore, be contrary to Article 5 of the Framework 
Convention is not very convincing. This provision effectively protects national 
minorities from assimilation against their own will but does not preclude the Member 
                                                 
58 Open Society Institute, Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Minority Protection (Vol I). An 
Assessment of Selected Policies in the Candidate States , (Budapest, 2002), 325. 
59  Joint statement of Latvia’s minority NGOs: “For a genuine integration, against assimilation”, at 
http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/minelres/archive/04161999-15:26:55-14291.html.   
60 Open Society Institute 2002, 342. See also www.lashor.lv.   
61 On the situation in Latvia Regarding Abolation of the System of Secondary and Professional 
Education in the Russian Language, at: http://www.mid.ru.    
62 The text of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities is available at: 
http://www.coe.int/T/E/human_rights/minorities/  
63 ibid. 
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States from taking measures in pursuance of their general integration policy. It can 
therefore be concluded that even if the Framework Convention would be binding to 
Latvia, legal action on this basis is very questionable. This is particularly true after 
amendments to the Education Law guarantee teaching in the minority language up to 
40 % of the entire curriculum.64  
 
In spite of this new situation, Latvian citizens have already lodged a complaint against 
Latvia before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).65 The applicants 
proclaimed that the education reform infringes Article 2 of the first Protocol to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, including a right of education for every person ‘in conformity with 
[his/her] own religious and philosophical convictions’. In a judgment of 1968, 
concerning the use of languages in the Belgian educational system, the ECHR decided 
that the notion ‘religious and philosophical convictions’ does not include the right to 
choose the language of instruction in schools.66 The Court also noted that the general 
prohibition of discrimination (Art. 14), even when read in conjunction with the above 
mentioned Article 2 of the first Protocol, ‘does not have the effect of guaranteeing to a 
child or to his parent the right to obtain instruction in a language of his choice.’67 
Notwithstanding the fact that legal experts have criticised this decision,68 it is obvious 
that the Belgian linguistic case gives a very strong argument to the Latvian 
government. Yet, the ECHR did not discuss this issue because the applicants could 
bring an action before the Latvian Constitutional Court.69 The ECHR can only act as a 
‘last resort’ after the education reform is conducted and all domestic remedies have 
been exhausted.  
                                                 
64 X, “Education reform 2004: law amended, problem not solved”, (71) Minority Issues in Latvia 
(2003), at  http://lists.delfi.lv/pipermail/minelres/2003-August/002884.html. It has to be mentioned, 
however, that MPs from the ruling nationalistic faction ‘For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK’ 
suggested a restrictive interpretation of the amendments. This would imply that only subjects related to 
minority identity and culture could be taught in minority languages. See: X, “Education Law: breaking 
promises, provoking conflicts?”, (79) Minority Issues in Latvia  (2004) at 
http://lists.delfi.lv/pipermail/minelres/2004-January/003161.html.   
65 ECHR, Appl. 36117/02, Grisankova and Grisankovs v. Latvia, judgment of 13 February 2003. 
66 ECtHR, Belgian Linguistics v. Belgium, judgment of 23 July 1968, Series A, No.6. The ECHR 
explicitly stated that ‘to interpret the terms “religious” and “philosophical” as covering linguistic 
preferences would amount to a distortion of their ordinary and usual meaning and to read into the 
Convention something which is not there.’ (Belgian Linguistics, para. 6). 
67 ibid., para. 11. 
68 Christian Hillgruber, Matthias Jestaedt, The European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Protection of National Minorities (Köln, 1994), 30. 
69 ECHR, Appl. 36117/02, Grisankova and Grisankovs v. Latvia, judgment of 13 February 2003. 
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Finally, reference has to be made to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is 
included as a specific chapter in the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe.70 Article II-14,3 of this document maintains that ‘the right of parents to 
ensure education and teaching of their children in conformity with their religious, 
philosophical and pedagogical convictions shall be respected.’71 Whereas this 
provision echoes Article 1 of protocol 2 to the ECHR, the reference to the parents’ 
pedagogical convictions is an important addition that could broaden the restrictive 
interpretation delivered by the European Court of Human Rights in the Belgian 
Linguistics Case.72 Apart from the observation that the Draft Constitution has to pass 
the entire ratification procedure before entering into force, the sentence that this right 
has to be exercised in conformity with the national legislation in this field limits the 
scope of this provision. Moreover, Article II-51,1 reveals that the Charter is applicable 
to the Member States ‘only when they are implementing Union law’. Given the 
limited Union competences in the area of education, the current meaning of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights seems to be rather limited for the Russian-speaking 
minorities in Estonia and Latvia. 
 
Consequently, it can be concluded that under the present situation there seem to be no 
clear legal grounds to obstruct the implementation of the Latvian Education Law. 
From a political perspective, however, it is obvious that a strict application of the 
language legislation increases the danger of social destabilisation. Education reform is 
one of the most controversial issues, provoking emotional reactions among the 
Russian-speaking minority. There is a widespread fear that Russian-speakers will face 
enormous learning difficulties. Furthermore, the lack of sufficiently prepared teachers 
is a major problem which threatens to undermine the quality of education. It is 
noteworthy that the Estonian Parliament decided to abolish the automatic switch to 
Estonian as the language of instruction in Russian public schools from 2007 onwards, 
referring to a lack of qualified teachers.73 Taking into account the political sensitivity 
                                                 
70 Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, CONV 850/03, Brussels, 18 July 2003 at: 
http://european-convention.eu.int. 
71 Emphasis added. 
72 See Belgian Linguistics Case; Niahm N. Shuibhne, EC Law and Minority Language Policy. 
Language, Citizenship and Fundamental Rights  (The Hague, 2002), 243. 
73 X, “Parliament keeps Russian-language Secondary Schools”, RFE/RL, 27 Nov. 2003, at 
http://www.rferl.org/balticreport.    
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of the educational reform, a similar move seems to be unlikely in Latvia. 
Nevertheless, an important amendment introducing that up to 40 % of the curriculum 
can be taught in the minority language has been adopted.74 Furthermore, the Minister 
for Education and Science announced the possible abolishment of the provision that 
only private schools with Latvian language of instruction are eligible for subsidies 
from the state budget.75  
 
These evolutions are important in the light of the European Commission 
recommendations.  According to the 2003 monitoring report on Latvia’s preparations 
for EU membership, Latvia is expected ‘to ensure sufficient flexibility regarding 
transition to bilingual education in minority schools’.76 This rather general and 
unclear provision exemplifies the European Commission’s reluctance of active 
engagement in the discussion on Russian-language minority education in Latvia. This 
observation can be surprising in the light of the attention paid to the use of minority 
languages in other Progress Reports and Accession Partnerships.77 Even more striking 
is the unambiguous statement of the 1997 Commission Opinion on Estonia’s 
application for EU Membership that state-funded education in the Russian language 
‘should be maintained without time limit in the future.’78 These obvious differences 
provoked allegations that the EU is using ‘double standards’ in the field of minority 
protection.79  
 
                                                 
74 X, “Education Reform: Amendments Adopted, Tensions Remain”, (73) Minority Issues In Latvia 
(2003), at http://lists.delfi.lv/pipermail/minelres/2003-September/002935.html.   
75 ibid. 
76 Emphasis added. European Commission, Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Latvia’s 
Preparations for Membership, at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/cmr_lv_final.pdf.   
77 For instance, the 1999 Accession Partnership on Slovakia referred to the necessity of protecting ‘the 
use of minority languages in the fields of education, culture and the media…’ ( OJ, 1998, C202/85). 
78 Opinion on Estonia, 15. 
79 See, e.g., Alexander Yakovenko, the Official Spokesman of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
regarding the Status of the Russian-Speaking Population in the Baltic States, 12 Nov. 2003, at: 
http://www.mid.ru.  
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5. Problems of integration on the brink of EU enlargement 
5.1.   The lack of effective anti-discrimination legislation 
The EU accession of Estonia and Latvia on 1 May 2004 does not imply that all EU 
legislation has already been implemented. The 2003 European Commission 
comprehensive monitoring reports on these countries’ preparations for membership 
reveal that in the field of anti-discrimination legislation ‘important shortcomings 
subsist with regard to the full transposition of the acquis’.80 Notwithstanding the fact 
that both the Estonian and Latvian constitutions as well as a number of specific laws 
contain provisions prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race or nationality81, 
legal experts have come to the conclusion that this is insufficient to comply with the 
so-called EU Race Equality Directive.82 The Directive establishes a general principle 
of prohibition of any direct or indirect discrimination based on racial or ethnic 
origin.83 This prohibition of discrimination applies to a wide range of areas, including 
employment, vocational training, social protection, education and access to goods and 
services.84 It does not cover difference of treatment based on nationality and is 
without prejudice to provisions and conditions relating to the entry into and residence 
of third-country nationals or stateless persons on the territory of Member States. In 
addition, the Directive does not apply to ‘any treatment which arises from the legal 
status of the third-country nationals and stateless persons’.85 In other words, the 
differences between citizens and non-citizens are not perceived as discrimination on 
                                                 
80 European Commission, Comprehensive Report on Latvia’s Preparations for Membership, 35. A 
similar observation can be found in the Comprehensive Report on Estonia’s Preparations for 
Membership, 35. 
81 Article 12 of the Estonian constitution establishes an explicit ban of discrimination: “Everyone is 
equal before the law. No one shall be discriminated against on the basis of nationality, race, colour, 
sex, language, origin, religion, political or other opinion, property or social status, or on other 
grounds. The incitement of national, racial, religious or political hatred, violence or discrimination 
shall, by law, be prohibited and punishable. The incitement of hatred, violence or discrimination 
between social strata shall, by law, also be prohibited and punishable”.  Article 91 of the Latvian 
constitution states that “All human beings in Latvia shall be equal before the law and the courts. 
Human rights shall be realised without discrimination of any kind”. 
82 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ, 2000, L180/22.  
For a legal analysis of the implementation of this Directive in Estonia and Latvia, see: Vadim 
Poleshchuk,  Report on measures to combat discrimination in the 13 candidate countries. Country 
report Estonia, May 2003; Gita Feldhune, Report on measures to combat discrimination in the 13 
candidate countries. Country report Latvia, May 2003, both reports are available at 
http://www.migpolgroup.com.      
83 Art. 1-2 of Directive 2000/43, OJ, 2000, L180/24. 
84 Art. 3,1 of Directive 2000/43, OJ, 2000, L180/24.  
85 Art. 3,2 of Directive 2000/43, OJ, 2000, L180/24.  
 18 
the basis of race and ethnic origin. Notwithstanding these important restrictions to the 
scope of the Directive, it lays down minimum requirements aimed at combating 
discrimination against ethnic minorities.  
 
Member States are under an obligation to ensure effective defence of individual 
rights.86 Victims of discrimination must have the right of redress through an 
administrative or judicial procedure. Once a plaintiff has established facts on the basis 
of which it can be presumed that there has been discrimination, the burden of proof 
shifts to the respondent.87 Plaintiffs are to be protected against victimisation and in 
particular against dismissal.88 Finally, Member States have the obligation to 
disseminate information on the anti-discrimination legislation in cooperation with 
non-governmental organisations,89 they have to establish a specialised body for the 
promotion of equal treatment90 and should provide for ‘effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive sanctions’ in case of breaches of the anti-discrimination legislation.91  
 
In the framework of the EU pre-accession process, Estonia and Latvia have adopted 
new legislation in accordance with the Race Equality Directive. The Latvian Labour 
Law, for instance, contains a general non-discrimination clause which is strengthened 
by a specific prohibition of differential treatment based on ‘race, skin colour, age, 
disability, religious, political or other conviction, national or social origin, property or 
marital status or other circumstances of an employee’.92 In Estonia, a general law on 
equality and equal treatment has been drafted.93 In addition to the drafting of new 
legislation, governmental bodies have been designed with tasks in the field of anti-
discrimination. The Legal Chancellor of Estonia – an independent official, provided 
by the constitution94, who is responsible for ensuring that legal acts adopted by the 
parliament and the local councils are in conformity with the constitution and the state 
                                                 
86 Art. 7 of Directive 2000/43, OJ, 2000, L180/25.  
87 Art. 8 of Directive 2000/43, OJ, 2000, L180/25. 
88 Art. 9 of Directive 2000/43, OJ, 2000, L180/25.  
89 Art. 10-12 of Directive 2000/43, OJ, 2000, L180/25.  
90 Art. 13 of Directive 2000/43, OJ, 2000, L180/25.  
91 Art. 15 of Directive 2000/43, OJ, 2000, L180/26.  
92 Art. 7 and 29 of the Labour Law, adopted 20 June 2001 and entered into force on 1 July 2002. The 
text of this law is available at http://www.ttc.lv.   
93 See Vadim Poleshchuk, Report on measures to combat discrimination in the 13 candidate countries. 
Country report Estonia, May 2003, at http://www.migpolgroup.com. At present (January 2004), the 
law on equality and equal treatment has not yet been adopted, in spite of the fact that September 2003 
was the official deadline for adoption. 
94 Chapter XII of the Constitution.  
 19 
laws – has been empowered to fulfil certain functions of an ombudsman, including the 
capacity to receive and examine residents’ complaints. A similar function has been 
given to the Latvian National Human Rights Office.95  
 
In spite of these legal and administrative developments, international observers have 
criticised the lack of effective anti-discrimination provisions. In its 2000 Regular 
Report on Estonia’s progress towards accession, the European Commission observed 
that ‘the capacities of the ombudsman, in particular as regards the protection of 
minorities need to be reinforced.’96 In 2002, the UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination expressed its concern about ‘the limited access to remedies to 
facilitate complaints over potential discriminatory violations in relation to, inter alia, 
the labour market, housing and education.’ In this regard, the Committee 
recommended the establishment of an Equality Council ‘as a national human rights 
institution, with the mandate to advise and monitor relevant legislation and practice, 
and with competence to deal with individual complaints against acts of discrimination 
in the public or private sector.’97 It can be mentioned that Max Van Der Stoel, the 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, had referred to the necessity of a 
special institution to deal with cases of ethnic or linguistic discrimination already in 
1993. 98  
 
In the framework of these international recommendations, the Estonian Parliament has 
significantly expanded the competences of the Legal Chancellor.99 The Chancellor 
will now be able to cover all issues of discrimination by natural and legal persons, 
both in public and private situations. In addition, his duties concerning the promotion 
and application of the principle of equal treatment are clearly written down in Article 
35 of the Legal Chancellor Act. From 1 January 2004 onwards, the new provisions 
have entered into force. Whereas the amendments constitute an important step 
                                                 
95 See Art. 2 of the Law on the Latvian Human Rights Office, at: http://www.vcb.lv.   
96 European Commission, 2000 Regular Report on Estonia’s Progress Towards Accession, 8 Nov. 
2000, 21.  
97 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Estonia, 
dated 23 Augustus 2002, CERD/C/61/CO/4, para. 15. 
98 “Letter to His Excellency Mr. Trivimi Velliste, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Estonia” (1993) by Max van der Stoel, in Hanne-Margret Birckenbach, Preventive Diplomacy through 
Fact-Findings. How International Organisations review the conflict over Citizenship in Estonia and 
Latvia (Hamburg, 1997), 235-242. 
99 Amendments to the Legal Chancellor Act have been adopted on 11 February 2003 and entered into 
force on 1 January 2004. The consolidated version of this Act is available at: http://www.legaltext.ee.  
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towards the implementation of the Race Equality Directive, further expansion of the 
anti-discrimination legislation is necessary to guarantee an effective protection of 
minority rights. Under the present situation, the Estonian legislation does not comply 
with the requirements concerning the burden of proof and the protection against 
victimisation as laid down in article 8 and 9 of the Race Equality Directive.100 Similar 
problems have been reported concerning Latvia.101  
 
In addition to the remaining challenges in the full transposition of the Directive 
requirements, there is a clear necessity to improve the dissemination of information on 
anti-discrimination legislation. Notwithstanding the fact that several sociological 
studies have reported the existence of indirect discrimination on the Estonian and 
Latvian labour market, only a limited number of cases have been brought to justice. In 
this regard, the UN Committee report on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 
Latvia ‘noted with concern that no case of dissemination of ideas of ethnic superiority 
or hatred, or the use of defamatory language or the advocacy of violence based on 
such ideas has been brought to justice, and no organisation involved in such activities 
has been prohibited, although the existence of such cases has been widely 
reported.’102  
 
Whereas the legal possibilities for enforcement of the principle of equal treatment 
exist, they are almost never used. This observation indicates that further action to 
disseminate information and public awareness on anti-discrimination legislation is 
necessary. Additionally, the classical problem of strengthened administrative capacity 
can be mentioned. The Latvian National Human Rights Office (LNHRO), for 
instance, has been coping with problems of funding and excessive workload.103 This 
ombudsman-like institution is entrusted with the task of promoting the observance of 
human rights and is entitled to review individual complaints and to strive for a 
                                                 
100 See Vadim Poleshchuk, Report on measures to combat discrimination in the 13 candidate countries. 
Country Report Estonia, May 2003, at http://www.migpolgroup.com. 
101 Gite Feldhune, Report on measures to combat discrimination in the 13 candidate countries. Country 
Report Latvia, May 2003, at: http://www.migpolgroup.com. 
102 Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in Latvia, 
dated 12 April 2001, CERD/C/304/Add.79., para. 11. 
103 Gite Feldhune, Report on measures to combat discrimination in the 13 candidate countries. Country 
report Latvia, May 2003, at: http://www.migpolgroup.com. See also: Expert Review Mission on 
Latvian Human Rights Office and Ombudsman Functions in Latvia: Considerations and 
Recommendations, Final Report, 22 May 2001, at: http://www.un.lv/down/undp_publ/omb/omb_e.pdf.   
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friendly settlement. The LNHRO does not have the power to enforce its 
recommendations or to levy any fines but it can submit a constitutional complaint to 
the Constitutional Court.104 In order to solve the existing administrative and 
operational problems, a presidential working group has been established in 2001. On 
the basis of this working group’s concept paper for the establishment of a specialised 
ombudsman office, an international expert mission has developed several proposals to 
strengthen the LNHRO.105 At present, however, further steps are required to 
implement these recommendations.106 It can therefore be concluded that, whereas the 
bones of a comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation exist in both Latvia and 
Estonia, there is a need to improve the effectiveness of the legal framework and the 
dissemination of information in order to comply with the EU standards as laid down 
in Directive 2000/43.  
 
5.2. The problem of statelessness  
The impact of the EU pre-accession strategy upon Estonia’s and Latvia’s domestic 
legislation does not exclude the continued existence of numerous problems and 
uncertainties after EU enlargement. Notwithstanding the measures adopted to 
facilitate naturalization, a considerable part of Estonia’s and Latvia’s population 
remains stateless.107 The United Nations Human Rights Committee concluded in its 
recent observations on Latvia and Estonia that this situation has adverse consequences 
in terms of the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms included in the International 
Convent on Civil and Political Rights.108 The reports identified problems concerning 
the exercise of political rights, the possibility to occupy certain state and public 
positions, the possibility to exercise certain professions in the private sector, 
restrictions in the area of ownership of agricultural land, as well as social benefits. In 
                                                 
104 See Law on the National Human Rights Office, at http://www.vcb.lv  
105 Expert Review Mission on Latvian Human Rights Office and Ombudsman Functions in Latvia: 
Considerations and Recommendations, Final Report, 22 May 2001, at: 
http://www.un.lv/down/undp_publ/omb/omb_e.pdf.   
106 Gite Feldhune, Report on measures to combat discrimination in the 13 candidate countries . Country 
report Latvia, May 2003, at: http://www.migpolgroup.com.  
107 According to the latest figures 495.000 non-citizens live in Latvia (21 % of the entire population), 
whereas in Estonia 172.000 people are stateless (12,5 % of the entire population). Official statistics 
from Latvia’s and Estonia’s statistical office (http://www.cbs.lv and http://www.stat.ee).     
108 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Latvia, CCPR/CO/79/LVA, dated 6 
November 2003 [hereafter: 2003 UN Human Rights Report Latvia]; Concluding observations of the 
Human Rights Committee: Estonia, CCPR/CO/77/EST, dated 15 April 2003 [hereafter: 2003 UN 
Human Rights Report Estonia].  
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contrast to the general and cursory statements of the European Commission regular 
reports, the concluding observations of the UN Human Rights Committee contain a 
number of clear and explicit recommendations. Estonia, for instance, is expected to 
abolish the legislation prohibiting non-citizens from being members of political 
parties.109 The report on Latvia pleads for the granting of voting rights to non-citizens 
in local elections110, a right which is explicitly included in the Estonian 
constitution.111 Both countries should further strengthen their efforts to reduce the 
number of stateless persons. Priority has to be given to the situation of children of 
non-citizens born in Latvia or Estonia after the restoration of independence in 1991. 
According to the existing legislation children of non-citizens achieve Latvian or 
Estonian citizenship upon request by their parents.112 This duty of registration 
explains the relatively limited results of the amendments to the citizenship laws. The 
European Commission welcomed this evolution in its 1998 Regular Report on 
Latvia113 and the 1999 Regular Report on Estonia.114  The Commission predicted that 
respectively 18.000 children in Latvia and 6.000 children in Estonia would benefit 
from the new provisions.115 The 2001 Report on Estonia116 observed that only 338 
minors received citizenship on the basis of the amendments to the Law on Citizenship 
whereas the 2002 Report on Latvia concluded that ‘altogether, 7.156 children had 
been granted citizenship by June 2002.’117 In the light of these figures the UN Human 
Rights Committee recommends further measures to encourage the registration of 
children as citizens. The Latvian Parliament already rejected the idea of abolishing the 
registration requirement as proposed by the pro-minority faction ‘For Human Rights 
in a United Latvia’.118 Nevertheless, certain amendments to the Citizenship Law are 
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elaborated in order to make Latvian citizenship easier available for children.119 The 
amendments, which could enter into force in June 2004, inter alia abolish a number of 
requirements and administrative obstacles but do not change the principle of 
registration upon request of the parents. It remains to be seen whether these 
amendments will significantly change the existing situation.  
 
5.3.  The risk of socio-economic divisions 
Whereas all international organisations agree that no evidence can be found of 
consistent discrimination, differences in legal status entail the risk of creating an 
ethnically composed group of disappointed and excluded inhabitants. The practical 
implementation of extensive language and citizenship requirements and its 
consequences on the availability of employment opportunities to the Russian-speaking 
and often stateless population is of particular importance in this regard.  The UN 
Human Rights Committee report on Estonia, therefore, encouraged the conduct of a 
study on the socio-economic consequences of statelessness, including the issue of 
marginalisation and exclusion.120 It can be argued that the exclusive approach to 
citizenship, as defined in the Latvian and Estonian legislation, is in itself already a 
form of exclusion. Lack of formal citizenship limits the permanent residents’ political 
rights, reduces the opportunities to hold a number of public positions and to become 
integrated in the welfare state.121 Furthermore, statistical research concluded that 
Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia have a significantly higher 
probability of being unemployed compared to the titular population of these countries. 
It is noteworthy that such an affiliation could not be found in Lithuania.122 Even more 
interesting is the observation that Russian-speakers holding citizenship of their 
country of residence have a significantly lower chance of being unemployed 
compared to non-citizens or citizens of other countries.123 It can therefore be 
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concluded that citizenship has an important impact on job opportunities and 
integration into the labour market.  
 
On the other hand, however, education and not ethnicity or citizenship has been 
identified as the most important variable in explaining social exclusion. The better job 
opportunities of non-titular citizens in comparison to their stateless compatriots would 
then be the result of their higher education and not of their legal status. It is rather 
difficult to analyse the relative weight of the factors ‘citizenship’ and ‘education’ in 
explaining the backward position of stateless persons on the Estonian and Latvian 
labour market. Both elements are mutually reinforcing because people lacking 
sufficient education will face more difficulties in passing the naturalization procedure. 
In addition, they will be less proficient in the national language, which is a basic 
requirement to acquire citizenship and to apply for many jobs in both the public and 
the private sector. Consequently, ‘language proficiency’ could also be identified as a 
main variable in explaining the differences on the labour market. This, in turn, can be 
related to the discussion concerning the education reform and the difficulties in 
finding the right balance between the promotion of the national language on the one 
hand and respect for minority languages on the other. This duality can also be found 
in the monitoring reports of the European Commission and the UN Human Rights 
Committee. Whereas the latter focuses on the necessity to guarantee minorities the 
right to ‘enjoy their own culture and to use their own language’124, the Commission 
reports only insist that the implementation of the language legislation should respect 
the undefined ‘principles of justified public interest and proportionality’125.  
 
The current debate on the education reform in Latvia reveals the sensitivity of a strict 
language policy. In addition, the existing differences in the legal status between 
citizens and non-citizens and its socio-economic consequences provoke a feeling of 
disappointment and discrimination among the Russian-speaking community.126 This 
phenomenon could have negative implications for the consolidation of the democratic 
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system and the possibility to use existing human resources for further economic 
development. It is, therefore, clear that the avoidance of an ethnically and 
linguistically divided society between ‘haves’ and ‘haves not’ is one of the most 
important challenges for Latvia’s and Estonia’s integration policy. As the 2002 
European Commission reports revealed, the integration policy should ensure the 
awareness, consultation and involvement of all sections of the population.127 The lack 
of a constructive dialogue between minorities and state institutions as well as the 
limited possibilities of political participation and representation of the Russian-
speaking population can be identified as an important obstacle to integration.128  
 
5.4. The problem of political participation and representation 
Both in Estonia and Latvia, minorities tend to be underrepresented in state 
institutions. In 2001, Estonian Russian-speakers made up only nine percent of all 
judges and six percent of officers within the Ministry of Internal Affairs whereas there 
were no Russian-speakers working as officials in the Ministries of Justice or 
Education.129 In Latvia, statistical research to minority representation in state 
ministries revealed that ‘minorities are employed by 65 percent less than their ratio 
among the citizenry’.130 Minorities are also insufficiently and unevenly represented in 
municipal councils and administration and are underrepresented in the judiciary.131  
 
It seems obvious that, among the less represented groups, the lack of proportionate 
representation in state institutions contributes to an increasing distrust in the 
functioning of these institutions. Consequently, additional measures to promote the 
political representation of minorities should be considered. In order to improve the 
existing situation, the impact of the so-called ‘revolutionary syndrome’ – which 
implies that employees of state institutions where chosen among people who had 
supported the re-establishment of independence rather than on the basis of formal and 
objective criteria– has to be tackled.132 In addition, lack of national language 
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proficiency and citizenship are two major factors restricting the opportunities of a 
significant share of the minority population. This is particularly the case for 
representation in elected institutions such as the parliament and city councils. Only 
after intensive international pressure, Estonia and Latvia abolished the requirement of 
the highest degree of state language proficiency for candidates in parliamentary and 
municipal elections (cf. infra). At the same time, however, the national constitutions 
contain important provisions protecting the state language as the only working 
language of these elected bodies.133  
 
Apart from these linguistic barriers, citizenship is the essential precondition for 
political participation. This is clearly illustrated by Article 48 of the Estonian 
constitution, which restricts membership of political parties to Estonian citizens. 
Article 57 of the Estonian constitution and Article 8 of the Latvian constitution limit 
the right to vote in parliamentary elections and referendums to citizens that have 
attained the age of eighteen. Whereas Article 156 of the Estonian constitution grants 
voting rights to all permanent residents in elections to local government councils, 
Article 101 of the Latvian constitution maintains that ‘local governments shall be 
elected by Latvian citizens who enjoy full rights of citizenship.’ In the framework of 
EU accession, Latvia will have to amend this provision in order to allow the 
participation of EU citizens in accordance with Article 19 EU and Council Directive 
94/80/EC of 19 December 1994.134 The 2003 comprehensive monitoring report on 
Latvia’s preparations for membership identified this issue as one of the remaining 
problems.135 Taking into account that the amendments have to be made before the 
municipal and European Parliament elections of June 2004, it is rather surprising that 
the latest Accession Partnership is completely silent on this issue.136  
 
Apart from the formal legal requirement to apply the acquis communautaire, the 
prospective constitutional amendment might provoke a public discussion on the 
granting of voting rights to non-citizens in municipal elections. In the framework of 
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the 2002 elections to the Latvian Parliament, the International Election Observation 
Mission concluded that ‘involving non-citizens in local decision-making could 
represent a tangible step toward eliminating the current democratic deficit’.137 A 
similar recommendation can be found in the concluding observations of the UN 
Human Rights Committee and in declarations of several high-level representatives of 
the Council of Europe and non-governmental organisations.138 In spite of this 
international pressure, the ruling political parties do not support such an extension of 
voting rights.139 The argument that this would decrease the motivation for 
naturalisation is also related to the political situation in Riga where approximately 35 
percent of the inhabitants are non-citizens. There is a widespread fear that the 
participation of these persons would lead to a profound political change in the 
capital.140 The situation in Riga perfectly illustrates the existing democratic deficit 
because more than one third of its population cannot vote in city council elections.  
 
The Latvian integration programme focuses on the promotion of naturalisation and 
language training but fails to take into account other measures to promote minority 
representation in the public sphere and in decision-making bodies.141 The possible 
implementation of positive discrimination measures and quota has been criticised for 
having ‘a negative psychological impact on members of various ethnic groups’ and 
for facilitating ethnic tension.142 The limited possibilities of political participation for 
the minority population contribute to a further alienation from the state institutions. 
The result is a vicious circle of self-segregation, a lack of motivation to pass the 
nationalisation procedure and the establishment of a serious and long-term democratic 
deficit. Against this background, fostering of loyalty to the state and diminishing the 
alienation from the state institutions are two important objectives of the state 
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integration programme. 143 The explicit link between integration and state loyalty can 
be related to the widespread perception that a ‘fifth column’ of Russian-speaking 
residents disloyal to the Latvian state could potentially undermine the internal stability 
of the country. From this perspective, the position of Russia, operating as the self-
declared kin-state of all Russian-speakers, cannot be neglected in the complex and 
sensitive framework of minority protection. 
 
6. The position of Russia and its geopolitical importance  
On several occasions, the Russian Federation has criticized the international 
community for turning a ‘blind eye’ to the infringement of the rights of the Russian-
speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia.144 Russian officials voiced concerns about 
the legal status of the Russian-speaking population after Estonia’s and Latvia’s 
accession to the EU.145 The ‘medium-term strategy for the development of relations 
between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000-2010)’ identified this 
issue as one of Russia’s primary interests in the framework of EU enlargement. 
Moreover, Moscow threatened that, as a ‘reserve option’, it could decide to refuse the 
extension of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement to those candidate countries 
‘that do not ensure the fulfilment of the generally recognised norms’.146 This latter 
statement might be seen as a scarcely concealed threat directed at the Baltic states, 
and Latvia in particular, which has been described as ‘the frontrunner in 
discrimination of the Russian-speaking population and in uncertainties for transit’.147 
Russia’s intention to secure that the EU applies its high standards for the admittance 
of new members will therefore focus in the first instance on the political criteria for 
accession. In considering the protection of the rights and interests of the Russian-
speaking population as its responsibility, Moscow has pushed to have this issue put on 
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the agenda of the European Union. In the beginning of 2003, Igor Ivanov, the Russian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, has issued a letter to the Greek EU Presidency and the 
European Commission demanding for additional pressure on Estonia and Latvia in 
order to enforce further steps towards improving the rights of the Russian speaking 
minorities before these countries’ EU accession on 1 May 2004.148 The Commission 
spokesman replied that ‘there is ample evidence the Baltic states are ensuring better 
treatment for ethnic Russians as part of their preparations for EU Membership’.149 
Additionally, he argued that ‘the situation should further improve after enlargement 
when even higher minority protection standards will apply to those two new member 
countries.’150 This explicit dismissal of Russia’s claims for further EU action on the 
issue of minority protection in Estonia and Latvia has provoked negative reactions in 
the Russian Duma. The European Commission has been accused of accepting EU 
enlargement ‘at any price, to the detriment of its high reputation’.151 In addition, it has 
been reported that Russia’s problems with Estonia and Latvia could potentially 
undermine the developing EU-Russia partnership. Taking into account the EU’s 
strategic and economic interests in good proximity relations with Russia152, it is 
therefore obvious that the issue of minority protection in Estonia and Latvia deserves 
particular attention.  
 
7. EU Enlargement as a ‘deus ex machina’?  
The legal status of the Russian-speaking and often stateless community is one of the 
remaining challenges of the historic EU enlargement project. An important question, 
for instance, is whether non-citizens will have a right of visa-free travel within the 
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EU.153 Other issues such as the right of access to job opportunities in other EU 
Member States and the possibility to take part in European Parliament elections are 
also of particular importance. These questions have been avoided during the EU 
accession negotiations. Obviously, the EU proceeded from the assumption that the 
prospect of accession as such would automatically solve the problems of integration 
of the Russian-speaking population. According to this somewhat naïve eurocentric 
approach, the non-titular population of the Baltic states is expected to receive a better 
protection within the EU. In this regard, Jekaterina Dorodnova argued that ‘with the 
entry of Estonia and Latvia into the EU, the discriminatory treatment of the Russian-
speaking minorities by the Estonian and Latvian governments is likely to become less 
pronounced.’154 Dmitri Trenin is even more optimistic:  
‘Hundreds of thousand of ethnic Russians will be quickly integrated into the new 
interethnic communities of the Baltic countries. The Baltic Sea Coasts will see 
new “Euro-Russians”. (Because of this, the non-titular population of the Baltic 
states react to the prospect of joining the European Union with greater 
enthusiasm than the indigenous population.)’155 
 
The latter assumption does no longer reflect the real situation. Statistical research 
conducted ahead of the accession referenda revealed that the attitudes of Baltic 
Russians did not differ significantly from those of the titular population.156 The 
perceived intensity of ethnic conflict and discrimination did not result in higher levels 
of support for EU membership among minorities. In contrast, minority perceptions of 
ethnic tensions and unfair treatment corresponded with more negative attitudes 
towards the EU. It has therefore been concluded that the Baltic Russians do not regard 
the EU as a guardian of their rights.157 This conclusion has been supported by the 
outcome of different opinion polls. According to survey result analyses in Latvia, 
conducted in July 2003, only 34 per cent of non-Latvians intended to vote in favour of 
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EU accession in comparison to, at that time, 53 per cent of Latvians.158 The last public 
opinion poll before the referendum reported 63 per cent of ethnic Latvians supporting 
accession in contrast to only 30,3 per cent of non-Latvians.159 Non-Latvians without 
citizenship were even more sceptical as only 27,4 per cent approved accession to the 
EU. Non-citizens feared negative changes on wages and pensions and did not expect 
any improvement in their status. In general, they showed a disinterest in information 
about the EU. This observation can be related to the fact that, according to the 
Estonian and Latvian constitution as well as corresponding referendum laws, only 
citizens were entitled to vote on EU accession. Consequently, 18 and 22 per cent of 
the Estonian and Latvian population was excluded from participation. These figures 
raise the question of democratic legitimacy. Only that part of the non-titular 
population that had successfully passed the naturalisation procedure could express its 
opinion in the accession referendum.  
 
An analysis of the referendum results confirms the suggestion that Russian-speakers 
tend to be more Eurosceptic. In Latvia, regions with a large proportion of Russian-
speakers such as eastern Latgale and Riga reported the lowest number of positive 
votes. In Daugavpils, a city with almost 40 per cent of non-Latvian citizens, a 
majority voted against EU accession.160 A similar pattern could be observed in 
Estonia. The least amount of yes votes was cast in Ida-Viru (57 per cent in favour and 
43 per cent against), not coincidentally the region with the highest number of Russian-
speakers.161 These results reveal that the ethnic minorities are not expecting major 
improvements in their legal status and even fear a further isolation and 
marginalisation as a result of EU enlargement. The lenient approach of the European 
Commission in combination with the continued pressure from Moscow and the 
remaining uncertainty about the consequences of enlargement can explain this 
situation.  
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8. The legal status of Estonia’s and Latvia’s non-citizens after EU 
Enlargement 
8.1.  Non-citizens and third-country nationals 
There are no specific legal acts regulating the status of the large number of Estonian 
and Latvian non-citizens in the EU. Consequently, these persons will be treated as 
third country nationals. In this regard, it can be mentioned that Article III-158 of the 
Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe explicitly refers to the fact that 
stateless persons shall be treated as third-country nationals whereas no references to 
statelessness can be found in the existing treaties.  
 
According to the ECJ’s established case-law, third country nationals –including 
stateless persons – cannot autonomously rely on the provisions concerning free 
movement of persons.162 All rights they have in this area depend on a family 
relationship with a migrant national of an EU Member State163 or an employment 
contract with an in an EU Member State established enterprise providing services in 
another Member State.164 On the other hand, third-country nationals and stateless 
persons are explicitly included in the personal scope of most EC legislation on social 
security rights.165 The ECJ confirmed the lawfulness of this situation on the basis of 
the international obligations of the Member States and the objectives of the social 
security regulations.166   
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force 1 May 1999, introduced 
important provisions for the development of the legal status of third-country nationals. 
On the basis of Article 63,4 EC the Council is entitled to adopt ‘measures defining the 
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rights and conditions under which nationals of third countries who are legally resident 
in a Member State may reside in other Member States.’ The October 1999 Tampere 
European Council167, which was completely devoted to the new provisions of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, laid down important guidelines for developing the legal status of 
third-country nationals. It maintained that the EU ‘must ensure fair treatment of third 
country nationals who reside legally on the territory of its Member States’ and ‘should 
aim at granting them rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens. The 
European Council clearly acknowledged that ‘the legal status of third country 
nationals should be approximated to that of Member States’ nationals.’ 168 The Heads 
of State or Government decided to pay special attention to the situation of third-
country nationals settled on a long-term basis:  
‘A person who has resided legally in a Member State for a period of time to be 
determined and who holds a long-term residence permit, should be granted in 
that Member State a set of uniform rights which are as near as possible to 
those enjoyed by EU citizens’.  
 
Finally and significantly, the European Council endorsed ‘the objective that long-term 
legally resident third-country nationals be offered the opportunity to obtain the 
nationality of the Member State in which they are resident.’169 Although not 
exclusively devised for their specific case, these conclusions of the Tampere 
European Council, drafted at a time when accession negotiations had already begun 
with Estonia but not with Latvia, are of particular significance for the legal status of 
these countries’ stateless population.  
 
The Tampere conclusions led to an important European Commission proposal for a 
Council Directive concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term 
residents.170 This document explicitly declares that the concept of third-country 
nationals also applies to stateless persons.171 The scope of the proposal is defined in 
broad terms, applying to ‘all third-country nationals residing legally in a Member 
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State, irrespective of the grounds on which they were originally admitted…the 
proposal also covers third-country nationals born in the territory of a Member State 
and residing there without having acquired its nationality.’172 The combination of 
these elements implies that this Directive, formally adopted by the Council on 25 
November 2003173, is an essential element for defining the future legal status of the 
large stateless communities in Estonia and Latvia.  
 
8.2. Directive concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-
term residents: an effective tool for solving the existing ambiguity?  
In order to guarantee fair treatment of third country nationals and promote their full 
integration, as called for by the Tampere European Council, Directive 2003/109 lays 
down criteria for the acquisition of a long-term resident status and determines its 
connected rights. In addition, the Directive clarifies the terms of residence in Member 
States other than the one which conferred the long-term resident status. The Member 
States, with the exception of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark174, have to 
implement these provisions by 23 January 2006 at the latest.175 
 
8.2.1.  Acquisition of long-term resident status 
According to the initial Commission proposal, ‘the chief criterion for acquiring the 
status of long-term resident should be the duration of residence in the territory of a 
Member State’. The Commission proposed a legal and continuous period of five 
years, a suggestion that has been accepted in the final Directive (Art. 4). In the 
framework of the consultation procedure, the European Parliament insisted on 
additional requirements: 
‘It seems wrong to make a minimum period of residence the sole criterion for 
the award of ‘long-term resident’ status. In the interests of the speedy 
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integration of third-country nationals with long-term resident status, 
integration-related requirements should also be imposed.’176  
 
This approach implied that ‘an advanced degree of integration into the life of the 
Member State concerned’ would be an important precondition for the acquisition of 
the long-term resident status. The European Parliament report explicitly referred to 
‘an adequate knowledge of the national language’ as an important criterion for 
appraising the level of integration. These suggestions found their way into the final 
text. Article 5, which contains the conditions for acquiring the long-term resident 
status, clearly states that:  
‘Member States may require third-country nationals to comply with 
integration conditions, in accordance with national law’.  
 
This condition, which was not included in the Commission proposal, seems to 
undermine the requirement contained in the initial document that ‘for the sake of legal 
certainty, it is essential that the acquisition of the status should not be left to Member 
States’ discretion where the conditions are actually met.’177 The Directive does not 
contain any specifications concerning the permissible national integration conditions. 
Consequently, it seems that the Member States will retain a large freedom of 
appraisal. Proceeding from the assumption that the Latvian and Estonian integration 
conditions reflect the requirements for the acquisition of citizenship, the limits of this 
Directive for the specific situation of Estonia’s and Latvia’s non-citizens become 
obvious.  
 
Another good example of the limitations imposed to the scope of the Directive is 
provided by the Council decision to eliminate the initial idea that for third-country 
nationals born in the territory of a Member State only the residence requirement of 
five years was applicable. Under the final Directive all third-country nationals 
applying for the EC long-term resident status, irrespective their place of birth, have to 
satisfy the additional conditions of stable and regular resources and sickness 
insurance. Furthermore, ‘Member States may refuse to grant long-term resident status 
on grounds of public policy or public security’ (Art.6). The Commission proposal 
clarified that these terms have to be interpreted according to the criteria laid down in 
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Directive 64/221/EEC applicable to EU nationals entitled to freedom of movement.178 
The European Parliament, however, considered such an approach ‘unacceptable and 
inappropriate’.179 Instead, it proposed that a departure from the provisions of Directive 
64/221/EEC could be justified by ‘overriding security considerations’ and on ‘general 
crime prevention grounds.’ It seems obvious that the European Parliament report, 
published on 30 November 2001, has been influenced by the 11 September terrorist 
attacks. Whereas the Commission proposal, published in March 2001, did not contain 
any reference to the threat of terrorism, the European Parliament proposed such 
references in the preamble and Articles 2, 7 and 19 of the Directive. The Council did 
not include these suggestions in the final Directive but only specified that ‘the notion 
of public policy may cover a conviction for committing a serious crime.’ It is 
noteworthy that during the discussions on the Directive proposal, the delegations of 
the Member States agreed to include in the minutes to the Council the following 
statement concerning Article 6: 
‘The notion of public policy and public security also covers cases in which a 
third-country national belongs to an association which supports terrorism, 
supports such an association or has extremistic aspirations.’180 
 
Apart from the extended conditions and restrictions in the final Directive, the 
procedure for acquiring the long-term resident status might hamper the potential 
effects of this new legislation upon the legal situation of non-citizens in Estonia and 
Latvia. To acquire this status, the long-term resident has to take the initiative. He/she 
should lodge an application to the competent authorities of the Member State of 
residence accompanied by documentary evidence that the necessary conditions of 
residence duration, stable and regular income, sickness insurance and, eventually, 
integration into the local community are met (Art. 7). Taking into account the existing 
problems in the process of naturalisation in Estonia and Latvia, which are mainly due 
to a lack of information and motivation on the one hand and restrictive integration 
requirements on the other, it is rather naïve to suggest that the new Directive will 
solve all problems of statelessness in these countries. Only a small group of well-
informed non-citizens can be expected to apply for this status whereas a large 
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majority of stateless residents might remain without a clear-cut legal position. On the 
other hand, it cannot be denied that the EC long-term resident status entails some 
important provisions protecting the rights of third-country nationals and, 
consequently, stateless persons. Again, however, the European Parliament and the 
Council have watered down the initial Commission initiative. A division can be made 
between a right of equal treatment with the citizens of the Member State, a right of 
residence in other Member States and enhanced protection against expulsion.  
 
8.2.2. Right of equal treatment 
The Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council called for an 
approximation of the legal status of third-country nationals to that of Member State 
nationals.181 In this context, the Commission proposed equal treatment in a wide area 
of economic and social matters, ranging from access to employment and self-
employed activities to education and vocational training and social protection and 
assistance.182 The European Parliament noted that a real ‘harmonisation in the form of 
equal status would do away with any incentive to seek citizenship of the host Member 
State, a step which third-country nationals should be encouraged to take with a view 
to fostering integration’.183 In line with this approach, the Council Working Party on 
Migration and Expulsion proposed, on the initiative of Germany, to drop the principle 
of equal treatment in favour of a more restrictive provision granting ‘benefits’ to long-
term residents ‘in accordance with the national law of the Member State.’184 The 
Commission, France, the Netherlands and Sweden opposed to this far-reaching 
amendment. Eventually, a compromise formula can be found in the final Directive. 
The general principle of equality of treatment is included, together with important 
restrictions limiting the scope of this provision. For instance, paragraph 3 of Article 
11 lays down that ‘Member States may retain restrictions to access to employment or 
self-employed activities in cases where, in accordance with existing national or 
Community legislation, these activities are reserved to nationals, EU or EEA citizens.’ 
Given the large number of such reservations in the Latvian and Estonian legislation, 
this sentence clearly limits the potential benefits of the EC long-term resident status 
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for the stateless or population of these countries. A similar remark can be made in 
connection with the other restrictions contained in the Directive: the fact that 
‘Member States may require proof of appropriate language proficiency for access to 
education and training’ and the possible limitation of social assistance and social 
protection to core benefits.185   
 
8.2.3. Right of residence in another Member State 
Apart from the references to equal treatment, an important chapter of the Directive is 
devoted to the right of residence in other Member States. This right refers to any stay 
in another Member State for a period exceeding three months (Admission to the 
territory for a period less than three months is covered by Article 62,3 EC and a 
forthcoming Council Directive186.) It is noteworthy that also the family members of 
the moving long-term residents have the right of residence in another Member State, 
even if they do not have a long-term resident permit themselves (Art.16).  Article 14 
of the Directive distinguishes three possible cases in which long-term residents may 
exercise the right of residence: i) as workers in an employed or self-employed 
capacity187, ii) as persons pursuing studies or vocational training or iii) without 
exercising an economic activity but in possession of adequate resources to reside in 
the second Member State.  
 
No later than three months after entering the territory of the second state, the long-
term resident must apply for a residence permit in that Member State (Art. 15). The 
latter state may ask for evidence, exhaustively listed in paragraphs 2 to 4 of Article 
15. In any case, the second Member State may check whether applicants have valid 
identity documents and a long-term resident’s permit. If the applicants intend to work, 
an actual or promised employment contract will be required. For self-employed 
activities evidence has to be provided concerning the available resources together with 
                                                 
185 Council Directive 2003/109, Art. 11,3(b) and Art. 11,4.  
186 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive relating to the conditions in which third-
county nationals shall have the freedom to travel in the territory of a Member State for periods not 
exceeding three months, introducing a specific travel authorisation and determining the conditions of 
entry and movement for periods not exceeding six months, Brussels, 10 July 2001, COM (2001) 388 
final. 
187 It has to be mentioned that the European Commission has also drafted a specific proposal for a 
Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of 
paid employment and self-employed activities, Brussels, 11 July 2001, COM (2001) 386 final.    
 39 
a description of the future activity. If the long-term residents want to exercise their 
right of residence in order to pursue studies or vocational training, enrolment in an 
accredited establishment, the availability of appropriate resources and sickness 
insurance can be demanded. If the long-term residents have no plans to work or study, 
the second Member State may require evidence of resources and sickness insurance.  
 
Parallel to the conditions concerning the acquisition of the EC long-term residence 
status, the Council introduced the possibility of additional restrictions to the right of 
residence in another Member State. According to Article 15,3 ‘Member States may 
require third-country nationals to comply with integration measures, in accordance 
with national law’ and ‘the persons concerned may be required to attend language 
courses.’188 Another important derogation from the principle of free residence is 
contained in Article 14,4. According to this provision ‘Member States may limit the 
total number of persons entitled to be granted right of residence, provided that such 
limitations are already set out for the admission of third-country nationals in the 
existing legislation at the time of the adoption of this Directive.’ Finally, restrictions 
to the right of residence are possible on the basis of public policy and domestic 
security (Art. 17), as well as public health (Art. 18).  
 
As soon as a long-term resident has received a residence permit in the second Member 
State, he/she shall enjoy equal treatment in same areas and under the same conditions 
as this was the case in the first Member State. (Art.21) Furthermore, long-term 
residents have access to the labour market of their state of residence. Again, the final 
Council Directive introduced an important limitation to this principle. The Member 
States may decide, in accordance with national law, the conditions of access to an 
employed or self-employed activity. Eventually, the long-term resident has the 
possibility to apply for a long-term resident status in the second Member State, 
subject to the conditions of duration of residence, stable and regular resources, 
sickness insurance and national integration requirements. (Art.23)  
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8.2.4. Protection against expulsion 
A third important aspect of the long-term resident status is related to significant 
safeguards against expulsion of long-term residents. (Art.12) This protection entails 
that a decision to expel a long-term resident can only be taken when he/she constitutes 
an ‘actual and sufficiently serious threat to public order or domestic security.’ 
Furthermore, this decision cannot be founded on economic considerations. Member 
States also have to take into account several aspects before taking a decision to expel 
a long-term resident, including his duration of residence in the territory of the 
Member State, the age of the person concerned, the consequences of this decision for 
the person and his family members as well as the links with the country of residence 
or the absence of links with the country of origin. Finally, this article contains 
provisions of judicial protection such as the guarantee of a judicial redress procedure 
and legal assistance to long-term residents lacking adequate resources.  
 
Obviously inspired by the ECJ case-law on free movement of persons, the initial 
Commission proposal went even further. The Commission document explicitly 
referred to the ‘personal conduct’ of a long-term resident as a condition for expulsion. 
In line with the ECJ judgment Adoui and Cornuaille personal conduct cannot be 
considered a sufficiently serious threat if a Member State does not take severe 
enforcement measures against its own nationals who commit similar offences.189 
Furthermore, criminal convictions as such do not automatically justify an expulsion 
decision. Explicit references to these effects have been deleted on the instigation of 
Germany and the Spanish Presidency.190 In addition, supplementary judicial 
protection measures such as the prohibition of emergency expulsion procedures and 
the requirement that judicial redress procedures have suspensory effect have been 
dropped in the final version of the Directive. It can therefore be concluded that the 
initial Commission proposal contained much more safeguards protecting the rights of 
long-term residents lacking EU citizenship. The Council also introduced important 
limitations to the principle of equal treatment between third-country nationals holding 
a long-term residence permit and EU citizens. The most problematic amendment, 
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however, might be the inclusion of additional conditions for acquiring the long-term 
resident status. In this framework, it is rather doubtful whether the new Directive will 
solve the existing problems of statelessness and legal uncertainty in Estonia and 
Latvia.  
 
8.3. Extension of EU citizenship as an instrument of integration? 
Notwithstanding the recognised importance of voting rights and access to nationality 
as important instruments of integration, the Commission did not address these 
elements because ‘the EC Treaty provides no specific legal basis for it.’191 In a recent 
Communication on immigration, integration and employment, however, the 
Commission expressed the opinion ‘that granting long-term resident immigrants 
political rights is important for the integration process and that the Treaty should 
provide the basis for so doing.’192 Moreover, the Commission re-introduced193 the 
concept of ‘civic citizenship’, defined as ‘guaranteeing certain core rights and 
obligations to immigrants which they would acquire over a period of years, so that 
they are treated in the same way as nationals of their host state, even if they are not 
naturalised.’194 The European Parliament expressly welcomed the inclusion of this 
concept, conferring on long-term resident third-country nationals ‘economic, social 
and political rights and duties, including a right to vote in local and European 
elections.’195 A similar reaction can be found in the opinion of the European 
Economic and Social Committee (EESC).196 Already in its opinion on the proposal for 
a Council Directive concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term 
residents, the EESC maintained that ‘the right to vote in municipal and European 
elections could be dealt with by European legislation.’197 The Committee proposed to 
discuss the idea of extending these voting rights, which are now reserved to EU 
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citizens, to long-term residents in the framework of the Intergovernmental 
Conference. In an own-initiative opinion, addressed to the European Convention, the 
EESC recommended the granting of EU citizenship to third-country nationals with 
long-term resident status.198 Several members of the Convention subscribed to the 
same vision that EU citizenship should not only be linked to nationality of a Member 
State but also to stable residence in the Union.199 Such an amendment of Article 17 
EC, which now defines EU citizenship as the exclusive privilege of nationals of EU 
Member States, would solve the existing democratic deficit in Estonia and Latvia 
were approximately one fifth of the population is excluded from participation in the 
European Parliament elections and, only in the case of Latvia, also in municipal 
elections. As a Union citizen, the stateless population would also have a right of 
diplomatic protection from any Member State authority in third countries in which 
Estonia or Latvia are not represented. The scope of the freedom of movement and 
residence, which is another basic right connected to EU citizenship, would not 
necessarily change as this provision is subject to the limits and conditions as laid 
down in the treaties and secondary legislation, in this case Directive 2003/109. Other 
rights enjoyed by Union citizens, such as the right to address a petition to the 
European Parliament and the right to make complains to the Community Ombudsman 
are already extended to resident third country-nationals.200 It can therefore be 
concluded that an extension of EU citizenship to long-residing third-country nationals 
is essentially related to the granting of voting rights to this category of persons. 
Taking into account the political sensitivity of this issue in many Member States, the 
EECS proposal has not been accepted by the Convention or by the IGC. Article 8 of 
the Draft EU Constitution retains the existing definition of EU citizenship.201 The 
rights connected to this status are repeated in Part II of the Draft EU Constitution, 
which incorporates the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
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9. Human Rights Treaties: effective instruments for the protection of 
Russian-speaking minorities? 
9.1. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: protecting the rights of stateless 
persons?  
Notwithstanding the fact that the Charter of Fundamental Rights forms an integral 
part of the forthcoming EU Constitutional Treaty, most of the rights enumerated in the 
Charter are conferred on all persons regardless of their nationality or place of 
residence. Consequently, the Charter forms an important source for defining the rights 
of third-country nationals and stateless persons. It has to be mentioned, however, that 
no explicit references to the problem of statelessness are included in the Charter.202 
Third-country nationals are mentioned only twice: in Article 15,3, which entitles 
nationals of third countries who are authorised to work in one of the Member States to 
working conditions equivalent to those of EU citizens; and in Article 45,2, which 
provides for the possibility of granting freedom of movement and residence to 
nationals of third countries legally resident in the territory of a Member State. Council 
Directive 2003/109 lays down the conditions under which third-country nationals can 
enjoy these rights (cf. infra).  
 
The relative absence of clear provisions on minority rights is another surprising 
observation. Only in Article 21 ‘membership of a national minority’ is identified as 
one of the grounds on which discrimination is prohibited. This non-discrimination 
provision seems to be rather limited in comparison to the Copenhagen political 
criteria for EU Membership, which require ‘respect for and protection of 
minorities.’203 Moreover, the Treaty on European Union does not explicitly mention 
the protection of minority rights, which creates a discrepancy between the EU 
accession criteria and corresponding membership obligations.204 For this reason, the 
Hungarian delegation to the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) proposed the 
introduction of a reference to the rights of national and ethnic minorities in Article 2 
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of the forthcoming EU Constitution. It is noteworthy that Slovakia and Latvia 
opposed to such an amendment.205    
 
Apart from the rather limited references to the specific situation of third-country 
nationals and minorities, the absence of a clear enforcement mechanism has been 
identified as a major flaw of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Convention 
Working Group on the incorporation of the Charter into the Draft Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for Europe did not fundamentally alter the content of the document but 
strongly supported its incorporation ‘in a form which would make the Charter legally 
binding and give it constitutional status.’206 As a result, the text of the Charter has 
been introduced as a specific part II of the forthcoming European Constitution. The 
provisions of the Charter are applicable to the institutions, bodies and agencies of the 
Union and to the Member States when they are implementing EU law. (Art.II-51) A 
problem, of course, might be the tight conditions of direct access by individuals to the 
Court of Justice on the basis of Article 203,4 EC. The restrictive notion of ‘direct and 
individual concern’ has been retained in Article III-270,4 of the Draft Constitution. In 
addition, it has to be kept in mind that individuals cannot sue Member States before 
the ECJ. Taking into account that the rights contained in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights correspond to a large extend to the rights guaranteed by the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, it can therefore be expected 
that the European Court of Human Rights will remain the main institution dealing 
with eventual infringements of minority rights.  
 
9.2. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights: Russian-
speakers vs. Latvia 
9.2.1. Article 8: Respect for family life 
Russian-speakers have already lodged several complaints against Latvia,207 mainly 
relating to alleged violations of Article 8 of the Convention. Art. 8,1 states that 
‘everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
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correspondence.’ The second paragraph of this Article (Art. 8,2) reveals that the 
public authority can only impose limits to this right ‘in accordance with the law’, in 
order to protect in a democratic society ‘the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country’ and ‘for the prevention of disorder 
and crime, for the protection of health and morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.’ The area of tension between the two paragraphs of Article 8 
became obvious in the so-called Slivenko case.208 The applicants in this case, Tatjana 
Slivenko and her daughter Karina, were permanent Latvian residents of Russian 
origin. Tatjana Slivenko, whose father was an officer in the Soviet army, moved to 
Latvia when she was one month old. She married Nikolay Slivenko, who served as a 
Soviet military officer in Latvia. Their daughter, Karina, was born in Riga in 1981. 
After Latvia regained independence in 1991, Tatjana and Karina Slivenko were 
entered in the register of Latvian residents as ‘ex-USSR-citizens’. In 1994, however, 
the Latvian immigration authorities annulled this registration, relying on the fact that 
Soviet military officers and their families were required to leave Latvia under the 
terms of the Latvian-Russian treaty on the withdrawal of Russian troops. 
Consequently, the Slivenko family received a deportation order. Only Tatjana 
Slivenko’s parents were allowed to stay because the Latvian-Russian treaty did not 
affect military officers that had retired from office before 28 January 1992, as was the 
case with Tatjana’s father. The applicants proclaimed that their removal from Latvia 
had violated their right to respect for their ‘private life’, their ‘family life’ and their 
‘home’ within the meaning of Article 8. The Latvian government, on the other hand, 
maintained that this decision pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of national 
security and the prevention of disorder and crime in a democratic society.209 The 
Court accepted that the Latvian-Russian Treaty and its implementing measures sought 
to protect the interests of national security. Accordingly, the obligation to leave the 
country was not in itself objectionable from the perspective of the Convention and 
Article 8 in particular:  
‘it is evident that the continued presence of active servicemen of a foreign 
army, with their families, may be seen as being incompatible with the 
sovereignty of an independent state and as a threat to national security. The 
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public interest in the removal of active servicemen and their families from the 
territory will therefore normally outweigh the individual interest in staying.’210 
 
However, application of removal orders without any possibility of taking into account 
individual circumstances is deemed to be incompatible with the requirements of 
Article 8.211 The Court referred to the applicant’s personal, social and economic ties in 
Latvia and concluded that they were sufficiently integrated into the Latvian society.212 
These elements were not taken into consideration by the Latvian integration 
authorities. Moreover, the Latvian government had based its decision on the family 
links with Tatjana Slivenko’s father, who was not himself considered to present a 
danger to the national security of the country. The Court, therefore, concluded that the 
Latvian authorities ‘overstepped their margin of appreciation’ and awarded a 
compensation amount of 10.000 Euro to each of the applicants. 
 
This decision provoked intensive discussion in Latvia. The Russian-language press 
reported satisfaction with the outcome of the case and announced a boom of new 
complaints.213 The Latvian side, on the other hand, stressed the fact that the ECHR did 
not challenge the legality of the removal of Russian military personnel as such, but 
only its strict implementation in this specific case.214 The sensitivity of this judgment 
is also related to the interference of Russia215 and the references made to the illegality 
of the Soviet occupation. The Latvian government submitted that the issue of the 
applicant’s removal from Latvia ‘ought to be examined in the context of the 
eradication of the consequences of the illegal occupation of Latvia by the Soviet 
Union’216, a statement that has been disputed by Russia.217 Whereas the ECHR 
consistently referred to the restoration of Latvia’s independence, and therefore 
implicitly confirmed the Baltic thesis on state continuity, it maintained that in the 
context of the case ‘it is not necessary to deal with the previous situation of Latvia 
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under international law.’218 In other words, the Court did not enter into the 
controversy between Russia and, in fact, each of the Baltic republics on the illegality 
of the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union.219 Only judge Maruste 
from Estonia expressly referred to the illegal Soviet occupation in a separate 
dissenting opinion. In his view, the removal of former Soviet military servicemen and 
their families has to be regarded as ‘redress for an historical injustice.’ The ECHR 
effectively accepted this vision but also tried to find a balance between the general 
principles of national security and sovereignty on the one hand and the individual, 
concrete situation of those affected by these principles on the other.  
 
In the near future, the Court has to conclude on other complaints lodged by family 
members of former Soviet military servicemen. Aleksandr Ivanov is one of these 
persons. He arrived in Latvia together with his parents and also passed his obligatory 
military service in the Soviet army on Latvian territory. After the restoration of 
Latvian independence, his mother and father, who had retired from military service in 
1987, have been registered as permanent residents of Latvia. Alekasandr Ivanov, 
however, received a deportation order on the basis of the Latvian-Russian Treaty on 
the withdrawal of Russian troops. The ECHR has adjourned its decision on the 
admissibility of the complaint that Latvia violated Article 8 of the Convention in order 
to give the Latvian government the possibility to submit its written observations on 
the application.220 A similar situation applies to Aleksandr Kolosovskiy, who has been 
refused a permanent resident permit as a result of his family ties with a Soviet military 
officer. The Latvian authorities also refused the registration of his marriage with a 
non-citizen and the registration that he is the father of his daughter.221 In Sisojeva vs. 
Latvia,222 permanent residency in Latvia was cancelled on the grounds that the family 
had also registered as residents in Russia. A similar question on the legality of this 
decision has to be answered in the case of Nina Shevanova223, whereas Natella 
Kaftailova224 and Ludmila Mitina225 are both divorced from their Russian husband 
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and applied for a permanent resident permit on the basis on their personnel links with 
Latvia. In Kovalenok v. Latvia226 the ECHR made clear that the simple fact of renting 
an apartment on the Latvian national territory, even for a long-term period, is not 
sufficient to assume a violation of Article 8. In another case, the Court revealed that 
the Convention does not guarantee to foreigners a right of entrance and residence in 
another state nor does it imply immunity for expulsion. It is up to the Member States 
to maintain public order, by exercising their right to control the entry and residence of 
foreigners.227 Furthermore, the Convention does not guarantee, as such, socio-
economic rights, the right to work, the right to free medical assistance or the right to 
claim financial assistance from a state to maintain a certain level of living.228 Finally, 
it has to be mentioned that the ECHR seems to limit the concept ‘family life’, as 
mentioned in Article 8 of the Convention, to the ‘core family’ only. In other words, 
the Court only takes into account the relationship between a couple and their children 
below the age of majority, excluding adult children and grandparents.229 This 
definition has been criticised by judge Kovler in his partly concurring and partly 
dissenting opinion on the Slivenko-case. The judge, inter alia, referred to the use of 
the broader interpretation of the family concept in previous judgments of the Court.230  
 
9.2.2. The ECHR and restrictions on electoral rights 
Apart from the numerous cases on the alleged violation of Article 8 of the 
Convention, the ECHR has dealt with complaints concerning the spelling of names231 
and, more important, the Latvian election legislation. According the 1995 
Parliamentary Election Act, candidates who have not completed their primary or 
secondary education in Latvian require a certificate of knowledge of the official 
language at the highest level, i.e. the ‘third level’. Ingrida Podkolzina, a Latvian 
national and member of the Russian-speaking community in Latvia, submitted a copy 
of this certificate upon registration as a deputy candidate on the list of the pro-
minority National Harmony Party for the 1998 Parliamentary elections.232 An 
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examiner employed by the State Language Inspectorate of the State Language Centre 
tested Mrs. Podkolzina’s ability to speak Latvian at her workplace. She was asked, 
among other questions, why she supported the National Harmony Party rather than 
any other party. The next day, the examiner returned accompanied by witnesses and 
asked Mrs. Podkolzina to write an essay in Latvian. Being extremely nervous as a 
result of the unexpected examination, she stopped writing and tore up her work. The 
examiner reported that Mrs. Podkolzina did not have an adequate commend of the 
official language at the third level, which led to the cancellation of her candidature for 
the parliamentary elections. Mrs. Poldkolzina alleged that the removal of her name 
from the list of candidates constituted a breach of the right to stand as a candidate in 
an election, as guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.  
 
The Latvian government maintained that the language requirement served a legitimate 
aim, namely the need to ensure the proper functioning of the Parliament in which 
Latvian is the sole working language. The Court accepted this vision and avoided to 
take position on the choice of Latvian as the only working language.233 
Notwithstanding the wide margin of appreciation for the states in this area, measures 
limiting the right to participate in national elections have to be proportionate to the 
aim pursued. In the present case, the Court noted that the applicant was in possession 
of the requested certificate but only failed to pass a supplementary language 
examination. The additional verification was carried out by one examiner, who was 
solely responsible for assessing the applicant’s linguistic knowledge. The Court, 
therefore, concluded that: 
 ‘in the absence of any guarantee of objectivity, and whatever the purpose of 
the second examination was, the procedure applied to the applicant was in any 
case incompatible with the requirements of procedural fairness and legal 
certainty to be satisfied in relation to the candidates’ eligibility.’234 
 
The conviction of Latvia in the Podkolzina-case followed a similar decision of the UN 
Human Rights Committee. In 1997 Mrs. Antonina Ignatane had been struck off the 
list of candidates for the 1997 municipal elections on the basis of ‘insufficient state 
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language proficiency’, notwithstanding the fact that Mrs. Ignatane was in possession 
of the third level language certificate. At that time, there was no possibility to submit 
a petition to the ECHR because Latvia had not yet ratified the European Convention 
on Human Rights. Mrs. Ignatane, therefore, submitted a written communication to the 
UN Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the International 
Convenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Committee found that Latvia had 
violated Article 25, in conjunction with Article 2 of the Convenant.235 
 
Notwithstanding this double conviction, the Latvian parliament did not show any 
immediate intention to amend the election law.236 Only after high-level pressure in the 
framework of the NATO enlargement process, amendments abolishing the state 
language requirements for deputy candidates in local and parliamentary elections had 
been accepted in May 2002. In a strongly worded speech to the Latvian Parliament a 
few months earlier, NATO Secretary-General George Robertson had warned that the 
outcome of the debate on amending the election legislation would significantly 
influence the decision about Latvia’s invitation to join NATO.237 It is therefore not 
very surprising that the amendments to the Election Act had been accepted few days 
before the NATO Reykjavik summit, where significant decisions concerning the 
further expansion of the alliance were on the agenda. In Estonia, a similar amendment 
had been accepted in November 2001 as an explicit condition for the shutting down of 
the OSCE observer mission in that country.238 At the same time, however, legislation 
was adopted to strengthen the position of Estonian as the only working language in 
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the parliament and local councils.239 Similar provisions were inserted into the Latvian 
constitution (cf. infra). 
 
Notwithstanding the implementation of these counterbalancing measures, the 
abolishment of the language requirement for deputy candidates perfectly illustrates 
the impact of NATO and OSCE conditionality provisions on Estonia’s and Latvia’s 
domestic legislation. At the same time, it reveals the rather limited influence of the 
European Commission on this issue. The 1997 Opinions on Estonia’s and Latvia’s 
application for EU Membership as well as the 2000 and 2001 Regular Reports on 
progress towards accession referred to the existence of high-level language 
requirements for candidates to parliamentary and local elections but did not contain a 
clear message that these restrictions had to be abolished.240 Moreover, no references 
to the election legislation could be found in the Accession Partnerships. In spite of its 
limited impact on the changing legislation, the 2002 Commission Reports extensively 
welcomed the amendments.241 The Commission also referred to the constitutional 
changes that had been adopted prior to the abolishment of the language requirements 
for deputy candidates. In order to strengthen the status of the state language, the new 
provisions introduced that Latvian will be the sole working language of the parliament 
and of local governments. In addition, Members of Parliament are obliged to swear 
their loyalty towards Latvia, and promise to strengthen its sovereignty and the status 
of the Latvian language as the only official language, defend Latvia as an independent 
and democratic state, fulfil their duties in good faith and observe the Constitution and 
laws.242 These clear measures protecting the national language politically compensate 
the abolition of the state language requirements for deputy candidates.243 In addition, 
they have to be seen against the background of the political discussion that emerged 
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after a high-ranking OSCE official suggested that Russian should be Latvia’s second 
official language.244 
 
The constitutional declaration that Latvian is the only working language in the 
parliament and city councils confirmed the existing situation. In this regard, the 
European Commission concluded that ‘the amendments essentially do not introduce 
new substantive changes likely to affect the functioning of either parliament or local 
government.’245 On the other hand, it also observed that the statements concerning the 
sole working language ‘represent a potential danger to the opportunities that exist in 
practice for the use of minority languages in dealings with public authorities.’246 This, 
however, did not result in any recommendations on this issue. The Commission also 
failed to mention the potential danger that the MP’s obligation to strengthen the 
Latvian language as the only official language may limit the rights of parliamentarians 
to propose amendments extending the use of minority languages.247 
 
The abolishment of the state language requirements for deputy candidates does not 
automatically solve all problems relating to restrictive language and election laws. An 
important case concerning the Latvian election legislation is still pending before the 
ECHR.248 Tatjana Zdanoka, the applicant in this case, has been disqualified from 
standing for election on account of her former membership of and activities within the 
Latvian Communist Party. This party has been declared unconstitutional after the 
restoration of Latvia’s independence. Article 5,6 of the Parliamentary Election Law 
and Article 9,5 of the Municipal Election Law prohibit the inclusion in the candidate 
lists of persons that ‘belong or have belonged to the salaried staff of the USSR, 
Latvian SSR or foreign state security, intelligence or counterintelligence services.’249 
The Latvian Constitutional Court concluded that this provision is justified in order to 
protect the integrity of the state but also envisaged a clear time limit for such 
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restrictions.250 Three judges formulated a dissenting opinion stressing that the Latvian 
democratic system is sufficiently stable to allow the abolition of the political 
restrictions for taking part in the elections.251 A similar view can be found in the 
conclusions of the International Election Observation Mission to the October 2002 
Parliamentary elections.252 According to this report, the political restrictions to deputy 
candidates are inconsistent with Article 7,5 of the OSCE Copenhagen document of 
July 1990, which calls on all OSCE participating states ‘to respect the right of citizens 
to seek political or public office, individually or as representatives of political parties 
or organisations, without discrimination.’253 The ECHR will have to decide whether 
the political restrictions also infringe the fundamental right to stand for election as laid 
down in Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights as well 
as Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, dealing respectively with the right to 
freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly and association. It can be 
expected that the outcome of this case will be another step in the process of dealing 
with the Soviet legacy and the clarification of the rights of the Russian-speaking 
minorities.  
 
Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the fact that the new Council Directive concerning the status of 
third-country nationals who are long-term residents might help to solve the current 
uncertainty about the legal status of Estonia’s and Latvia’s stateless population after 
the accession of these countries to the EU, the conditions for acquiring the long-term 
resident permit limit the potential benefits of this status to a group of well-informed 
and well-integrated persons. Taking into account the political sensitivity of 
immigration policies and against the background of the 11 September terrorist attacks, 
the Council has introduced important amendments limiting the initial scope of the 
Commission proposal. In addition, it has to be mentioned that the long-term resident 
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status will not resolve the exclusion from political participation of the Estonian and 
Latvian non-citizens. The only option to take part in European Parliament elections 
and, in the case of Latvia, in municipal elections is to acquire the citizenship of these 
countries. It can be argued that EU enlargement will provide a new incentive for 
naturalisation. Whereas the number of applications for citizenship has increased after 
the positive outcome in the EU accession referenda, the current rate of naturalisations 
will not allow for a quick solution of the existing problems. As the UN Human Rights 
Committee reports reveal, additional efforts will be needed to reduce the number of 
stateless persons. The proposed amendment to the Estonian Citizenship Act under 
which the state would compensate language-learning expenses to those who pass the 
citizenship exam is one of the measures in this direction.254  
 
Apart from the continuous concerns about the high number of stateless persons, the 
socio-economic consequences of a strict state language policy in the field of 
employment and education have to be taken seriously. The discussions on the 
Education reform in Latvia reveal the sensitivity of this issue and the difficulties of 
finding the right balance between the requirements of integration and respect for 
minority identities. Whereas all international organisations agree that no forms of 
systematic discrimination towards the Russian-speaking and often stateless population 
can be observed, a lack of attention to these people’s rights increases the danger of 
social destabilisation, which, in turn, can adversely affect international relations 
(particularly since Russia has declared that respect for the rights of Russian-speaking 
minorities is a major priority of its foreign policy).  
 
The European Union has a huge responsibility in this area. The process of EU 
enlargement is expected to bring stability and prosperity on the entire European 
continent. It is clear that this objective cannot be achieved when the rights of the 
Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia are not observed. The EU pre-
accession conditionality has - together with the efforts of other international 
organisations such the UN, the Council of Europe, NATO and the OSCE - resulted in 
a number of amendments to laws on education, language and the status of non-
citizens, efforts which can be praised as largely eliminating the possibility of ethnic 
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violence. This, however, does not imply that all problems of integration have been 
solved or will automatically disappear as a result of EU enlargement. Tackling the 
high number of stateless persons and the comparatively low number of 
naturalisations, problems of political participation and the socio-economic impact of 
restrictive language and citizenship policies remains an importance challenge. 
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